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Abstract
Many trade and environment issues will confront agriculture over the next several
years. This report provides an economic framework to better understand these issues
and discusses prior empirical inquiries and findings. Four primary issues are ad-
dressed: (1) how will environmental policies affect agricultural trade?; (2) how will
agricultural trade liberalization affect environmental quality?; (3) to what extent
should there be international harmonization of environmental policies and product
standards?; and (4) is there economic justification for using trade measures to protect
the environment? This report demonstrates that basic economic paradigms can provide
a basis for understanding how trade and the environment interact. The few empirical
studies based on these concepts have found many of the linkages between trade and
the environment to be weak or the effects small. Trade and environment issues remain
important to monitor, however, because economic and environmental relationships
and domestic and international policies are continually evolving, and decisionmakers
need good information to confirm or disprove the numerous hypotheses that have
surfaced in international discussions.
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Agricultural trade barriers are coming down at the same time that environmental
awareness is increasing in many parts of the world. Trade and environmental inter-
ests sometimes clash, as governments, industries, businesses, environmentalists,
and consumers push their competing agendas. This report examines the trade
and environment issues likely to confront world agriculture over the next sev-
eral years.
The four main issues are:
1. How will environmental policies affect agricultural trade? Governments
can choose a variety of regulations or taxes to reduce the level of pollution
(soil erosion and loss of wildlife habitat, for example) that may occur in the pro-
duction of agriculture and food products.
Studies, mostly in manufacturing, have found that environmental regulations
designed to reduce pollution have not led to significant changes in trade. The
main reason for this may be that the costs of environmental compliance have
tended to be small in relation to overall costs on an aggregated sectoral basis.
However, these regulations may have significantly affected some localities or
commodities or may be more significant in the future.
2. How will agricultural trade liberalization affect environmental quality?
The GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Uruguay Round agree-
ment and NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) aim to liberalize
trade by reducing trade barriers. These agreements, particularly NAFTA, also
addressed environmental issues, such as those related to food, health, and safety
standards, the role of international environmental agreements, and relaxation of
environmental measures for attracting foreign investment.
The effect of freer agricultural trade on environmental quality depends on what
happens to the level of economic activity and associated pollution, the intersec-
toral changes in economic activity, and changes in production methods. Well-
designed and enforced environmental policies are more likely to ensure that
trade liberalization will bring economic growth and gains in environmental qual-
ity. Economic growth and higher incomes engendered by free trade may also
lead to a greater social preference for the resources available to achieve environ-
mental improvement.
3. To what extent should there be international harmonization of environ-
mental policies and product standards? Variation of environmental policies
makes economic sense because countries differ in their demand for and supply
of environmental amenities. However, harmonization of environmental policies
including product standards designed to protect health, safety, and the environ-
ment may improve market performance by lowering costs and improving the
quality of consumer information. International environmental problems can also
be alleviated by harmonization of environmental performance standards.
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environment? There is a spectrum of issues for which there has been interest
in using trade measures for environmental purposes, including efforts to control
pollution generated by a trading partner, measures to protect the global commons,
actions taken against imported products not meeting domestic standards, and ef-
forts to level the playing field. Economic concepts justify the use of trade
measures in some cases. However, global environmental problems are often bet-
ter addressed by voluntary negotiations and by consensus policies that do not
interfere with international trading rules. Again, the message is that sound envi-
ronmental policy directed at the problem is preferred to restricting trade.
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BECC—Border Environmental Cooperation Commission
CODEX—Codex Alimentarius Commission
CTE—Committee on Trade and Environment
EU—European Union
GATT—General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IEA—International Environmental Agreements
IPM—Integrated Pest Management
MMPA—Marine Mammal Protection Act
NAAEC—North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
NADB—North American Development Bank
NAFTA—North American Free Trade Agreement
NAPIAP—National Agricultural Pesticide Impact Assessment Program
NTB—Non-tariff Trade Barrier
OECD—Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PPM—Production and Processing Methods
S&P—Sanitary and Phytosanitary
WTO—World Trade Organization
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The linkages between international trade and the envi-
ronment frequently are the focus of domestic and
international discussions. International policy forums
such as the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, the Committee on Trade and Envi-
ronment (CTE) under the auspices of the new World
Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) all
discuss trade and environment issues.
1 For approximately
2 years, WTO and OECD discussions have focused on
such topics as: (1) how environmental policies affect
trade and competitiveness, (2) how agricultural trade
liberalization affects environmental quality, (3) to what
extent international harmonization of environmental
policies and product standards should exist, and (4)
what economic justifications exist for using trade
measures for environmental quality.
Part of the discussion stems from concerns of environ-
mental and consumer groups (Greenpeace, Sierra Club,
National Wildlife Federation, and Public Citizen, for
example), which generally support a closer scrutiny of
the environmental effects of multilateral and regional
trade policies and an international consensus with
their recommendations on conservation, sustainable
development, and safer and healthier products. Some
environmental and consumer organizations complain
about the allegedly negative environmental effects of
shifts in production and trade due to trade liberalization.
Also, some environmental groups worry that interna-
tional trade agreements will encourage harmonization
of environmental policies at lower national standards
than those currently in force in industrialized nations.
Finally, some of these groups favor the use of trade in-
struments to achieve their environmental policy goals.
Another aspect of the discussion originates from in-
dustry groups, including farm and food organizations.
These groups often are concerned that domestic envi-
ronmental regulations will impair their international
competitiveness. If environmental regulations increase
domestic costs of production, they argue, competing
exporters should face similar constraints. A related issue
of concern to food processors is the myriad of labeling
and packaging standards among countries. Industry
groups wonder if different foreign standards are legiti-
mate or whether they are covert trade barriers. Harmoni-
zation of labeling and packaging standards, including
“ecolabeling” (labels that reflect environmental harm
associated with production, consumption, or disposal
of the products), has been raised at international forums
as a means of addressing perceived unfair competition.
Trade and environment issues also generate apprehen-
sion among developing countries. Developing country
groups are concerned that their environmental standards
and enforcement, if less strict than those of developed
nations, may invoke trade restrictions from developed
countries. While less environmental protection may be
the result of lower economic development levels and
fewer resources, lower standards also make a convenient
1In April 1994, more than 100 nations including the United States
agreed to reduce trade barriers and create a new World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO). The Committee on Trade and Environment also
was established at this time. The multilateral agreement, negotiated
under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), was ratified by the United States in December 1994. The
WTO will supersede the GATT as the international organization
governing global trade. Trade and the environment is one of the
main agenda items of the new WTO.
Exploring Linkages Among Agriculture, Trade, and the Environment / AER-738 Economic Research Service / USDA v 1and popular justification for trade complaints from en-
vironmental and producer groups in developed countries.
Economists and policy analysts have begun to explore
the linkages between trade and environmental quality.
Some economic tenets are clear in the debate. It is
widely accepted that freer trade leads to increased eco-
nomic efficiency and economic growth, but these gains
neither guarantee improvements in environmental qual-
ity—such as reductions in erosion, improved surface
and groundwater quality or increased wildlife habi-
tat—nor necessarily create environmental problems. At
the same time, environmental policy may significantly
improve environmental quality, but its effects on produc-
tion, trade, and competitiveness are not well understood.
Environmental Policies, Trade,
and Competitiveness
Economists use the term “externality” to describe a
harmful or beneficial side effect that occurs in the
production, consumption, or distribution of a particular
good. Production of an agricultural good may generate an
environmental externality, for instance. To produce the
good, a farmer, rancher, or forester chooses a technology
and input mix (land, labor, machinery, and chemicals)
to maximize profits. In the production process, wastes
or amenities may be produced as a byproduct. These
are environmental externalities if they affect the well-
being of others and the farmer does not pay the costs
of the waste cleanup or receive compensation for the
benefits of the amenity provided.
An externality often occurs when there are ill-defined
or poorly enforced property rights, for example, when
resources such as ground and surface water or air over a
city are owned by the community or by no one. Exter-
nalities also tend to occur when those affected are
widely dispersed and difficult to identify (Pearce and
Turner, 1990). Markets may fail to reflect the cost to
the community of the externality.
2
Agricultural practices can cause both negative and
positive externalities. Farmers do not bear all the costs
associated with agricultural production, such as soil
erosion, water depletion, surface and groundwater pol-
lution, deforestation, loss of wildlife habitat, and chemical
misuse and contamination. On the other hand, they do
not reap the benefits of recreational amenities that may
be produced. Environmental effects can also occur or
be exacerbated by government when public policies
raise or lower input and output prices above or below
market levels that would exist in the absence of such
policies. Some examples of support programs are export
restitutions, deficiency payments, and import quotas.
Market failure occurs in a competitive environment
when market prices differ from social costs (private
costs of production plus environmental or “external”
costs or benefits). Producers or consumers may have
little incentive to alter activities that contribute to pol-
lution or to adopt environmentally beneficial technologies
because these external costs do not enter their private
costs of production. Often, policies in the form of
regulations (such as standards, bans, and restrictions
on input use) and incentive-based mechanisms (such
as taxes, subsidies, and marketable permits) are imple-
mented as corrective measures. While these policies
may meet their environmental goals, they also affect
production, trade, investment, technological change,
and consumption. Such effects may be particularly im-
portant to agricultural producers and food processors.
Selection of Environmental Policies
and Policy Instruments
To provide private market incentives for pollution
abatement, policymakers must address two interre-
lated issues: how much pollution should be reduced
and what type of policy is most effective in achieving
that goal? To answer the first question, we need to know
the value society places on the damage from pollution,
such as that associated with contaminated water or car-
cinogens in the air, and the net benefits from production
at different levels of economic activity (fig. 1).
Society could opt to eliminate most, if not all, pollution,
but the costs of doing so may well exceed the benefits.
For example, while all pesticides could be banned from
agricultural use, this could drastically reduce the food
supply or make it very expensive. In this case, the out-
put and pollution levels would be less than Q
* and P
*.
A more economically rational approach is to compel the
producer to pay an amount equal to the costs of the pol-
lution, for example, a tax on production (t in figure 1).
The producer’s marginal net benefit curve shifts down-
ward with a tax of rate t on each unit of production,
and production is Q
*, the point at which the marginal
net benefits from production equal zero. The optimal
tax is that tax rate leading to economic activity and
pollution at the social optimum (Q
* and P
*), eliminating
the gap between private and social costs.
2Market failure would not exist if the negative externality generated
in the production process affected only a next-door neighbor with
clearly defined property rights. The producer and the neighbor could
privately negotiate a payoff to reduce the level of the bad externality
and an efficient solution could be attained. Whether the producer
pays the neighbor or the neighbor pays the producer depends on who
owns the property rights associated with the offending pollutant.
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often called “command and control” approaches, as well
as incentive-based mechanisms such as taxes, subsidies,
and marketable permits. Regulations can take the form
of standards or quotas for allowable discharge levels;
restrictions on economic activity in certain environ-
mentally vulnerable areas; bans on the use of products
with potentially adverse environmental effects; or the
setting of standards for products or for production and
processing methods.
Industrialized countries use a variety of environmental
regulations in food and agriculture including regula-
tions on packaging, labeling, and the recycling of waste;
restrictions on land use; restrictions and bans on the use
of certain agricultural chemicals; quotas on the produc-
tion and application of manure; restrictions on the
number of animals per hectare or the size of livestock
operations; and restrictions on dumping pollutants
into ground- or surface-water supplies.
Taxes can be levied to reduce polluting activities or the
use of polluting inputs. Taxes can also be used to raise
revenue in support of research into environmentally
preferred technologies or the undertaking of a new













Optimal pollution level and tax
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA, adapted from Pearce and Turner, 1990.
Figure 1—This figure describes the value society places on the damage from pollution, such as that associated with contaminated
water or carcinogens in the air, and the net benefits from production at different levels of economic activity. Following Pearce and
Turner, these damages and benefits can be represented by marginal external costs (MEC) and marginal net private benefits
(MNPB). The MEC curve measures the additional costs of pollution to society from changes in production levels. We draw the
MEC as upward sloping to reflect the greater per unit cost from environmental damage at higher levels of economic activity. The
MNPB schedule shows the benefits, minus private costs, flowing to the producer from different levels of production. Ignoring the
social costs of production, the producer would choose to produce at level Q
1, with an associated level of pollution P
1, at levels
higher than the societal optimum. When social costs are considered, society’s optimal level of economic activity, and the associated
level of pollution, occur at that level of production where the marginal benefits to producers equal the marginal costs of pollution
to society (Q*, P*).
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rates must be set very high to significantly reduce pollu-
tion in vulnerable areas (Haley, 1993). When taxes are
employed, the country is said to be following a “pol-
luter-pays” approach.
3 Although taxes can be imposed
at different points in the production cycle, economic
theory suggests that targeted taxes are more efficient
than more general ones. For instance, effluent taxes
are superior to producer taxes or levies on trade because
they can be specific to firms or industries that pollute
in regions where the environment is slow to recover.
Effluent taxes could spark technological change that
reduces emissions per unit of output (Beghin, Roland-
Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe, 1994). A practical
difficulty of targeting taxes in agriculture is that many
of the environmental issues associated with agricultural
production are nonpoint problems. How to determine
who is polluting and, therefore, whom to tax becomes
a critical obstacle.
Subsidies are another environmental policy instrument.
Subsidies provide compensation to produce less pollution
or to employ environmentally “friendly” technologies,
which may also be higher cost technologies. Payments
to farmers willing to engage in soil conservation and
water-quality improving practices represent a “pay to
conserve” approach used in some developed regions,
such as the United States and the European Union (EU).
Taxes and subsidies can have different effects on sector-
wide output and total pollution. A tax raises the costs of
doing business for a firm (or reduces the price received
by the firm) and discourages the polluting activity. A
subsidy encourages environmentally sensitive inputs
and, therefore, discourages the polluting activities of
the firm. However, subsidies do have possible down-
sides. Unlike a tax, a subsidy approach may encourage
new firms to enter (or discourage firms from exiting)
the industry by lowering private average costs of pro-
duction. While the incentive for each firm is still to
pollute less, an increase in the number of firms may
lead to expanding total industry output and possibly
an increase in pollution (Pearce and Turner, 1990).
A marketable permit is another policy instrument that
provides more flexibility among firms in meeting gov-
ernment-established environmental regulations. In contrast
to producer taxes, marketable permits allow for a
nonuniform distribution of costs of compliance to gov-
ernment standards. For example, when a tax policy
targets a group of producers identified with a particular
source of pollution, each producer pays a fixed marginal
tax rate based on the level of inputs used or output
produced, even though some producers may be polluting
at higher rates than others. If, instead of being hit with a
production tax, all firms were issued equal permits to
pollute, those with a higher rate of pollution could pur-
chase permits from the “cleaner” producers (or reduce
their pollution levels). The result: heavier polluters pay
higher costs to produce. For example, marketable permits
might be used in livestock operations; farmers who
produce intensively or have soils that are more suscep-
tible to nitrate overloading may need to purchase permits
from less polluting operations or may need to reduce
the intensity of their operation. Similarly, marketable
permits could allow trade-offs across types of polluters—
those who emit pollutions from the end of a pipe and
those who are nonpoint source or diffuse polluters, such
as agricultural producers (Letson, Crutchfield and Malik,
1993). Provided that the barriers to marketable permits
are not too high (regulations and administrative costs,
for example), marketable permits theoretically can
achieve the same end as taxes, with lower costs to pro-
ducers and consumers.
Environmental Policies, International Trade,
and National Welfare—Effects on Production
How does environmental policy affect production, con-
sumption, trade, and prices? To answer this question, we
need to consider several factors: (1) does the externality
occur in the production or consumption process? (2) is
the externality local to the country, transboundary, or
global? (3) does the externality occur in the exporting
country, importing country, or both? (4) what type of
environmental policy is adopted? (5) is the environmental
policy enacted in the exporting country, the importing
country, or both? and (6) is the exporting or importing
country a large enough trader of the good to influence
world market prices?
In our first illustration, we consider the small-country
case, where the polluting country is unable to influence
world prices. Pollution occurs in the production of a
traded good, but the pollution’s effects are strictly local.
We assume that an environmental tax is imposed on
the output of the good, such as an output tax placed
on the livestock industry to reduce the effects of excess
manure production on water (fig. 2).
4 Imposition of an
environmental tax will reduce domestic production, pol-
lution, and exports. However, domestic consumption
levels will remain unchanged, since consumers face
3The Polluter Pays Principle was approved by member countries
of the OECD in 1972. Under this principle, the public owns envi-
ronmental resources and those who pollute these resources must
pay compensation to the public (Baumol and Oates, 1988).
4The reader can bypass figures 2-9 without losing the main content
discussed in the text. The figures provide additional technical detail.
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are hurt, society overall is better off.
In our second illustration, we consider a similar exter-
nality; now, however, the country is a large trader of
the good and capable of influencing world prices. The
importing country also produces the good but does
not require environmental protection, possibly due to
a larger capacity to absorb contaminants or different
societal priorities in regard to this type of pollution.
The imposition of an environmental policy in an ex-
porting country is likely to have a trade-reducing effect,
at least in the short term, and to shift competitiveness


















Trade and welfare effects of an optimal output tax for environmental purposes
in a small country exporter
s
s
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Figure 2—This figure describes market conditions in a small exporting country before and after the imposition of an environmental
tax. The before-tax supply schedule Sp reflects only the private (or internal) costs of producing, for example, livestock products;
the after-tax supply schedule Ss reflects the full societal costs of production, which include the private production costs and the
costs to society of the effects on water quality. Thus, the tax internalizes to the industry the external costs of its operations, which
raises industry costs and reduces the supply of livestock products to the market. The tax is “optimal” because it eliminates the
gap between private and social costs at each potential unit of production.
The country is small in terms of supplying the world market, so it is unable to affect the world price. Before the tax, the country
produces at Qs
0, consumes Qd, and exports Qs
0 -Q d , in response to world price level WP. After the tax, producers, in response
to a domestic price of DP
1, reduce production to Qs
1. Domestic consumption remains unchanged, so exports fall to Qs
1 -Q d .
Producers lose welfare represented by areas ABCDE, and consumer welfare is unchanged. Government tax revenue increases
to ABCD, while environmental damage falls by EF. On net, the exporting country is better off by area F. The optimal environmental
tax has thus made the country better off.
5Although conventional economic logic underlies this and sub-
sequent illustrations, there are several simplifications from the complex
real world. The illustrations assume that the world consists of two
countries (or two groups of countries), that markets are perfectly
competitive, and that there are no costs related to international transac-
tions. Also, it is assumed that the good is homogeneous and imple-
mentation of the environmental policy does not change other prices,
income, population, technology, or consumer tastes.
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Trade and welfare effects of an optimal output tax for environmental purposes in a large country exporter
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Figure 3—Panel one describes the market conditions in the exporting country before and after the environmental tax. As in figure 2, the before-tax supply schedule S p
reflects the private costs of production and the after-tax supply schedule Ss reflects the full societal costs of production. The middle panel shows that the effect of
dampening production incentives in the exporting country is to reduce its supply to the world market, as shown by a shift in the position of the excess supply schedule
to ESs from ESp. The effect of the shift is to reduce trade from the pretax level of QT
0 to the after-tax level QT
1 and to shift global production toward the importer.
Some of the burden of the tax on producers also falls on domestic and foreign consumers. This happens because the exporting country’s sector is large enough to cause
prices to rise when it reduces supply in response to a tax or regulation. A small country, in contrast, would be unable to turn the “terms of trade” in its favor when
implementing a supply-reducing environmental policy (fig. 2).
An environmental policy implemented in a large exporting country affects the welfare of market participants in both nations. In the exporting country, producers and
consumers incur welfare losses equal to areas labeled EFGHIL and AB, respectively. Government tax revenue increases, however, as represented by area ABCDEFGHI,
and social damage costs generated by the production of the good fall by area JKL. Therefore, the exporting country is, on net, better off by areas CD (terms-of-trade
































































































8This occurs because the environmental tax increases
the cost of production for the exporter thereby reducing
its incentive to produce and trade. Because it is a large
supplier, some of the increased cost of production is
shifted to foreign and domestic consumers, implying
that domestic producers and consumers and foreign
consumers pay the costs of reducing domestic pollution.
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The size of the tax relative to other costs of production
is a critical element in determining how strong the out-
put and trade effects of the tax might be. The exporting
country as a whole—taking into account society’s
valuation of environmental benefits—is still better off.
The imposition of an optimal tax assures that the benefits
of reduced pollution outweigh the tax-induced costs to
producers and consumers.
Environmental policies can also influence the compo-
sition of agricultural production and trade. As the cost
structure of a regulated industry or activity rises relative
to that of other less-regulated industries or activities,
productive resources will shift toward the less-regulated
sectors. Resources may be encouraged to move out of
agriculture should environmental controls in agriculture
become more restrictive than in other industries. These
output composition effects also influence the relative mix
of agricultural output and trade. For example, produc-
tion and export of less fertilizer-intensive crops, such
as soybeans, might be encouraged should a fertilizer
tax be implemented. The composition effect may also
influence the relationship between primary production
and processing of agricultural products. Pesticide re-
strictions or livestock density limitations could reduce
production of raw sugar, fruits, vegetables, and livestock.
A country may then import more primary products for
processing or may import the processed products and
shift resources out of agribusiness.
Theoretically, environmental policies influence the level
and composition of trade through their effects on pro-
duction costs. The direction and magnitude of the effects
of environmental regulation vary due to several factors,
including stringency and type of environmental measure.
All else equal, stringency is likely to be proportional to
the level of environmental degradation, since societies
tend to target resources at their most urgent problems.
The EU’s high livestock density and subsequent manure
pollution problems led to the enactment of their Nitrate
Directive, one of the strictest nitrate pollution meas-
ures in the world. Countries in the EU have flexibility
in the type of measure implemented; a headage tax on
livestock producers or density restrictions would have
different effects on the composition and level of trade.
The United States, with fewer nitrate problems, does
not have such a strict national nitrate regulation.
Another factor may be the breadth of application of an
environmental measure. An environmental regulation
targeted at a particular geographic site or environmental
problem may result in geographically diverse costs.
However, price and trade competitiveness at the national
border may not be affected. One other factor is the
availability of alternative low-cost or cost-reducing
production techniques. If alternative low-cost techniques
are not available, the cost of complying with an envi-
ronmental policy in the short term could be high.
Empirical Examples:
Environmental Policy Effects on Trade
Empirical studies of nonagricultural industries generally
find that environmental policies do not significantly
affect trade. The studies, which vary markedly in
methodology, time period of study, and industry of focus,
are summarized by Dean (1992); Pearce (1993); Beghin,
Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe (1994); and
Jaffe, Peterson, and Portney (1995). Examples include:
· Walter (1973) found average annual overall environ-
mental-control costs for U.S. exports at 1.75 percent
of their total value and for U.S. imports 1.5 percent of
their total value. In a more recent study, Tobey (1990)
found U.S. environmental regulation costs to be no
more than 1.85 percent of total costs for 40 industries
and between 1.85 and 2.89 percent of total costs for
24 industries.
· Reductions in output caused by environmental control
costs are insignificant on average, although significant
for some individual sectors. A study by Yezer and
Philipson (1974) found that the percentage decrease
in output attributable to environmental control costs
for 14 industrial sectors averaged less than 1 percent.
· There is little evidence of any significant effect of
environmental control costs on patterns of trade. Ro-
bison (1988) suggested that marginal changes in en-
vironmental control costs will affect the U.S. trade
balance, but that the effect would be small overall. 6In the small-country case, domestic producers absorb the entire
cost increase.
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industrialized and developing countries have been an
industry concern. Industrialized-country producers
fear that stricter domestic environmental regulation
will give developing-country producers a competitive
edge. Developing-country producers worry that they
will have to comply with stricter industrialized-country
standards. Slade (1991) found that production and
trade effects of developing-country producers adopt-
ing industrialized-country standards and industrialized-
country producers adopting stricter standards are very
small for the two sectors examined—nonferrous metals
and energy. Low (1991) estimated that Mexico’s ex-
ports would be reduced by less than 2 percent if it
adopted an environmental tax equivalent to U.S. policies.
Little empirical work exists on the trade effects of envi-
ronmental policy in the agricultural sector. Some studies
lend support to the above generalizations. Tobey (1991)
showed that environmental regulations in industrial
countries are unlikely to change agricultural trade signifi-
cantly. Tobey determined the relative pollution intensity
of 10 crops based on nitrogen and pesticide use and
average soil erosion. Assuming that industrial countries
were more likely to regulate pollution-intensive com-
modities (tobacco, peanuts, corn, and sorghum) and that
developing countries’ export market shares of these
commodities constituted a modest proportion of world
trade, Tobey found that the change in agricultural export
patterns from industrial countries to developing countries
was likely to be small as a result of developed-country
agro-environmental policies.
Ballenger, Krissoff, and Beattie (1995) examine specific
agricultural commodities and particular environmental
concerns. Ballenger and others looked at orange and
apple juice trade in Western Hemisphere countries
and the health risk to farmworkers from exposure to
pesticides. They estimated that the cost of regulations
to protect U.S. workers was no more than 0.5 percent
of total production costs and could be as low as 0.08
percent of total costs beyond the first year. Assuming
that juice-exporting nations in Latin America implement
similar worker protection regulations, Ballenger and
others found that such harmonization only marginally
affected the value of exports.
In contrast to the estimates reported above, current and
proposed agro-environmental regulations in some nations
could significantly alter production costs, output, and
trade, at least in the short run, in selected product mar-
kets. The National Agricultural Pesticide Impact Assess-
ment Program (NAPIAP) of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) examined the short-term economic
implications of banning methyl bromide (MB) for soil
and product fumigation (USDA, 1992).
7 The NAPIAP
assessment found that effects on the United States would
be costly because currently available alternative control
practices are less effective or more expensive than MB.
The study estimated annual economic losses of approxi-
mately $1.3-$1.5 billion, with much of the loss borne
by U.S. consumers in the form of higher prices for fruits
and vegetables, particularly tomatoes and strawberries.
The study measured economic losses under both “closed”
(no imports) and “open” economy scenarios, concluding
there were few differences between scenarios. In a closed
economy, producer revenues actually increased as the
price rose (particularly for tomatoes), more than off-
setting the production decline, with the burden of the
loss falling totally on consumers. In an open economy,
the price rise associated with the production decrease
was offset by imports from competing products (such
as Mexican tomatoes). Domestic producer revenues
fell, with the economic loss more equally shared by
producers and consumers.
The NAPIAP study also indicated that some 35 fruits,
vegetables, and nuts from over 130 countries required
MB or an alternative treatment as a condition of entry
into the United States. The loss of MB as a quarantine
fumigant might restrict imports of many of these com-
modities. Additionally, U.S. exports of several fruits,
nuts, cotton, and oak wood to particular countries require
fumigation with MB to meet their quarantine regulations.
Exports of these commodities, valued at nearly $250
million in 1991/92, would be affected by the ban.
An American Farm Bureau-sponsored study concluded
large-scale changes in supply and production costs for
many fresh and processed fruit and vegetable crops
would occur if pesticide use were cut by 50 percent
or simply ended. The study, directed by Knutson
(1993), examined 9 fruits and vegetables in 12 U.S.
States and concluded that average yields across the
commodities and States could decline by 70 percent
with pesticide elimination. While this estimate is very
high, the scenario is extreme, extending far beyond
most environmentalists’ recommendations. More real-
istic is a policy to eliminate some pesticides rather
than all pesticides, allowing producers to substitute
other agrochemicals and limiting declines in yields.
EU legislation that will become effective in the late
1990’s may significantly affect the environment. High
7The Montreal Protocol seeks to regulate the use of methyl bro-
mide due to its effect on the ozone layer. Under the U.S. Clean Air
Act, production and importation of methyl bromide were frozen in
1994 at 1991 levels. Production and imports are also to be phased
out by the year 2001.
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throughout the EU, can adversely affect the health of
humans and livestock and promote eutrophication of
water bodies. (Eutrophication reduces the amount of
oxygen levels due to an increase in nutrient levels,
making a body of water more supportive of plant life
over animal life). In response to rising regional nitrate
levels, regulations directed at farming practices in the
EU have been enacted at both the national and EU level.
The 1991 EC Nitrate Directive attempts to restrict the
application of livestock manure and chemical fertilizers
in areas with high nitrate levels. USDA’s Economic
Research Service (ERS) has indicated that the Directive,
due to take effect in 1999, may reduce livestock pro-
duction in Belgium by 29 percent, the Netherlands by
65 percent, Denmark by 9 percent, and would translate
into EU-wide reductions in livestock production of
roughly 8-10 percent (Leuck and others, 1995). Results
imply that EU beef exports could be reduced by as much
as a third and change the EU from a net exporter of
pork and poultry to a net importer (Haley, 1993).
East Asian governments have also begun to regulate
livestock waste to improve the environment. For instance,
Taiwan has enacted legislation to reduce animal waste
pollution, although enforcement has been limited (Taha,
1992). In Japan, the hog industry has become more
concentrated as the number of producers has fallen.
The number of hog producers fell by over 30 percent
during 1990-92, while swine inventories fell just under
8 percent (Taha, 1992). Part of this change in the in-
dustry is attributed to environmental regulation that
created high investment costs in handling livestock
wastes. These findings suggest that Japanese environ-
mental controls could significantly affect production
costs and output, with potential implications for trade




Environmental regulations often raise production costs
and reduce competitiveness in the short term, but long-
term effects are less certain as firms adjust and
innovate. A 1992 study by the Office of Technology
Assessment indicated that some firms adapted to regu-
lations in ways that offset any early cost disadvantage
and, over the long run, those firms have even benefited
from the regulations. Deteriorating quality of ground
water associated with the overuse of water through
central-pivot irrigation technologies in the U.S. Plains
States has propelled institutional changes (taxes, subsidies,
and regulations) directed at improving the quality of
ground water. Runge, Houck, and Halbach (1988) found
that the regulations, in turn, altered input values and
imposed costs on producers, inducing a change in input
use and the subsequent choice of alternative technologies.
Thus, changes in relative factor prices stimulate inno-
vative activities. Both private producers and public
research institutions innovate to remedy the constraint
imposed by the policy-induced factor scarcity. Runge
and others (1988) argue that environmental regulation
can act as a signaling mechanism that stimulates research
into environment-conserving technologies. In their irri-
gation and groundwater example, the regulations limiting
water use increased its scarcity value and stimulated
research into more efficient “drip-irrigation” technologies.
Environment-saving technological change allows more
goods to be produced with less damage to the environ-
ment (fig. 4). Such technological change can allow a
country to improve environmental quality without con-
stricting crop production.
8An important theoretical point is illustrated here. The livestock/
manure production structure has a Leontief relationship; that is, there is
a fixed input-output association. When technology is Leontief, regulat-
ing output is as efficient as regulating the effluent. Other environ-








Effects of environment-saving technological change
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Figure 4—The downward-sloped production-possibility frontier
indicates that crop production must decline to improve water
quality. Initially that trade-off is relatively steep, as indicated
by the move from point A to point B. Environment-saving
technological change, such as pest-resistant crop varieties,
can expand the production-possibility frontier and allow the
country to improve water quality without a corresponding loss
in crop production, as indicated by the movement from point
A to point C along a new production-possibility curve. The
adopting country’s competitive advantage in world markets for
agricultural crops may also be enhanced, although the new
crop varieties may quickly transfer to other countries as well.
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and Foreign Direct Investment
National environmental policies may exert longrun
effects on international investment flows and firm loca-
tion. Just as labor-intensive industries may concentrate
where labor is abundant (everything else equal) polluting
industries may concentrate in countries with less strin-
gent environmental policies (everything else equal).
One concern is that developing countries, in particular,
may use their lower environmental standards to attract
foreign investment and stimulate economic growth.
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Another is that countries that are moving toward stricter
environmental regulations will encourage industrial and
capital flight toward countries offering “pollution havens.”
Little evidence supports the pollution-haven hypothesis,
particularly concerning the importance of differing envi-
ronmental standards for foreign direct investment in the
food and agriculture sectors. Pearson’s survey (1987)
finds little evidence of industrial flight to developing
countries as a result of differing environmental stand-
ards. In another study, Pearson (1976) estimates that
developing countries may have increased their export
revenues by 2.1-4.6 percent by lowering their environ-
mental standards. Duerkson and Leonard (1980) conclude
that there is no evidence of widespread relocation of
U.S. industries to pollution havens. However, Molina
(1994), investigating pollution abatement costs and
U.S.-Mexico trade in food-related products, finds some
evidence to support the pollution-haven hypothesis.
He finds that in U.S. industries that incur higher water
and solid waste abatement costs relative to Mexico, the
United States is more likely to import from that industry
and, consequently, firms are more likely to migrate.
The decision to relocate is a complicated decision in-
volving, among other factors, total variable costs (not
just costs of meeting environmental regulations), relo-
cation costs, and transportation costs associated with
shipping goods back to domestic markets. In the pro-
duction of crops, the quality and availability of land and
water resources are also likely to play an important role
in the decision to relocate production. In general, stronger
economic criteria drive investment location decisions,
such as access to foreign markets, lower production
costs, or investment credits. Cost reductions associated
with less strict environmental regulations are likely to
be small compared with other cost factors such as wages
(OTA, 1992). For example, in recent years, U.S. poultry
processing and fruit processing firms have relocated
or expanded to Mexico to take advantage of lower labor
costs as well as to produce for the Mexican market.
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An added benefit to these firms may be in the lower
water-quality standards in Mexico (resulting in less
management of effluents), but it is unlikely to be the most
important factor in the decision to produce in Mexico.
Firms cannot always gain from lower foreign environ-
mental regulations if traded products must meet quality
or environmental standards in the importing country,
a requirement particularly relevant for agricultural
commodities. For example, some pesticides that cannot
be legally used in U.S. crop production can be used in
Mexico. While these pesticides may be legal and
cheap in Mexico, commodities that contain residues
of these pesticides cannot enter the United States.
While there appears to be limited evidence from formal
studies of changes in investment and firm location due
to environmental regulation in agriculture, the adoption
of more stringent policies in industrialized countries
could introduce costs that, at the margin, lead businesses
to relocate. As new environmental regulations are intro-
duced across the globe, there is a greater need for
empirical studies to examine the role of environmental
policy and its effects on foreign investment in agriculture
and agribusiness.
Product Standards, International Trade, and
National Welfare—Effects on Consumption
The interface between consumption policies relating to
product standards and international trade requires a
different analysis than that for production-based envi-
ronmental standards. Product standards can pertain to
the product itself (for example, the food item), the
packaging materials, or the information contained on
the package. They can be imposed for environmental
purposes (which are referred to as environment-related
product standards). Product standards can relate to ani-
mal and plant health or environmental issues in a number
of ways, particularly through food health and safety risks
of consuming the product or disposing of its packaging.
Product standards may affect costs of production and,
therefore, the product’s competitiveness in international
markets. Failing to meet product standards can also di-
rectly inhibit the acceptability of a nation’s products in
export markets. Because of this trade-restricting effect,
product standards may cause trade frictions.
There are several examples of product standards for food
and agricultural products that may be justified on eco-
9There are various reasons why a developing country’s environ-
mental standards differ from an industrialized country. See “Harmoni-
zation of Product and Environmental Standards and Production and
Processing Methods” on page 21.
10The United States does not import poultry from Mexico because
their processing facilities do not meet USDA regulations and because
Newcastle’s disease and avian influenza are present in some areas.
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implicit trade barriers. For example, governments use
food safety standards to assure that consumers are not
exposed to unsafe levels of pesticide residues in foods.
Government involvement is widely accepted, since
consumers would be unlikely to be able to make the
safety determination themselves. Governments serve to
reduce consumer uncertainty of food safety (one aspect
of product quality) by increasing the amount of accu-
rate product-quality information. Without government
intervention, sellers may market poor-quality food as
high-quality food and reap undeserved returns. Were
that to happen, the average quality of food would then
fall, reducing the size of the market (fig. 5). The legiti-
macy of using product standards at country borders to
restrict imports continues to be based on “scientific
principles,” although the level of the standards adopted
may reflect society’s values. Numerous trade disputes






















Asymmetric information and product standards
World market
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Figure 5—There are two exporters in this figure who sell commodity “W” to the world market. Exporter A produces a high-quality
commodity, while exporter B produces a low-quality commodity; both sell their excess supply to world markets. (In theory, both
A and B could produce and sell both qualities of the good, but we simplified the story here for graphical purposes.) At a world
price of WP
0, Exporter A sells Qs
0 -Q d
0and exporter B sells larger quantities Qs
1 -Q d
1. This is because Exporter A faces higher
production costs than does Exporter B and is less willing to sell the commodity at comparable prices. Thus, there is a greater
supply of the low-quality commodity in the world market.
Without accurate information, the world market demand by importers for commodity ”W” is the average of good and bad quality
in the short run. Over time, purchasers of the low-quality commodity become less likely to demand it. Thus, world demand declines
and eventually only low-quality commodity is sold. Exporter A has effectively been driven out of the world market by a lower quality
product.
Governments can reduce consumer uncertainty in product quality by establishing product standards. Consumers could then make
informed purchasing decisions, allowing higher quality products to become available.
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level of food safety standards.
One distinguishing feature of environment-related product
standards is that “societal preference” (a cleaner envi-
ronment, for example) often overrides “available scien-
tific and technological information” as a justification for
a standard. For example, the disposal of food-product
packaging can be an environmental issue. Societal costs
to dispose of packaging waste are not captured in the
market price of food products. Consumers may purchase
a product that is initially inexpensive but costs more
to society in the long run because of the added cost of
disposing of its packaging waste. This added cost of
disposing of packaging waste disposal is called a “con-
sumption externality.” Consumption externalities may
lead to regulations mandating that packaging materials
be recyclable or imposing consumption taxes on the
offending products. These regulations or taxes may
restrict product trade (fig. 6). Even an optimal consump-
tion tax can restrict trade, although it may improve overall
social welfare in the country that addresses the externality.
Other examples of trade restrictions stemming from
societal preferences for a product or production-process
standard include:
· European restrictions on beef imports from countries
using chemical growth stimulants;
· U.S. restrictions on imports of shrimp caught in a way
that harms sea turtles, and a similar attempt to ban
imports of tuna caught in a way that harms dolphins;
· European restrictions on furs from countries that use
leg-hold traps for capture.
A country that develops an environment-related prod-
uct standard for domestic products will likely apply
the same standard to imported products. The standard
can affect both exporters and domestic and foreign
producers. If exporters cannot meet the standard, trade
may be restricted; if higher production costs affect do-
mestic and foreign producers differently, their market
positions in the importing country will be affected.
Foreign exporters may also incur a loss in economies
of scale because these different packaging standards
affect only a portion of total product sales.
Environmental labeling is another policy instrument.
Ecolabeling provides consumers with information so
that their preferences for environmental protection can
be better expressed in the marketplace. Labeling of tuna
fish cans to indicate the fishing methods employed—
“dolphin-friendly tuna”—is an example of ecolabeling.
Labeling standards, while possibly affecting trade,
would not necessarily be considered a nontariff trade
barrier (NTB), since consumers, rather than the gov-
ernment, discriminate among suppliers (domestic and
foreign) in the marketplace. In fact, a 1991 GATT
panel ruled in favor of the U.S. “dolphin-friendly
tuna” label over Mexican objections that the label is
an NTB (see box—“Tuna-Dolphin Cases”).
Packaging costs comprise a significant share of final
food product value— over 10 percent in 1992 (Dunham,
1994). Food and beverage industries use many types of
containers, including metal cans, glass containers, plastic
bottles, folding cartons, and corrugated containers.
Packaging standards, such as recycling, and labeling
requirements may affect international trade and competi-
tiveness of processed food products.
Although there are efforts within OECD and WTO to
formulate international rules regulating packaging and
labeling standards, one basic principle of the WTO must
be adhered to: that imported and domestic products be
treated equally. In other words, the imposition of a
product standard aimed at affecting only the imported




The effect of freer agricultural trade on environmental
quality depends on several factors, such as the level of
production, mix of post-reform goods, variable input
use, land use, technical change, and the assimilative
capacity of the natural resource base. Three separate
mechanisms are at work:
(1) the scale effect, which describes what happens
when trade liberalization changes the level of
economic activity (for example, both economic
activity and pollution levels may increase under
freer trade);
11In a recent case ruled on by a GATT panel, U.S. environmental
rules that affected imports more than domestic goods were challenged
by the European Community (EC). In 1993, the EC protested U.S.
car fuel-efficiency rules, the “gas guzzler” tax, and the luxury tax,
claiming that these policies discriminated against European imports.
The United States made the case that these policies were in place to
reflect preferences for natural resource conservation and environ-
mental protection and that they were not designed to be discrimina-
tory. The GATT panel sided with the United States, upholding all
provisions except one aspect of the car fuel-efficiency rules that es-
tablished separate domestic and import fleets for the calculation of
corporate average fuel efficiency rates.


















































Trade and welfare effects of an optimal tax on consumption
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Figure 6—The curves Dp and Ds for the importing country represent national demands before and after an optimal consumption tax, which eliminates the external costs
of consumption. Dp and Ds reflect the private and social benefits of consumption; the area under Ds encompasses the consumer gain in purchasing commodity “X” and
the loss from the externality associated with the consumption of “X”. The change in the quantity demanded due to the tax, Q d
2 to Qd
3 , triggers a reduction in demand
for the imported product as well, indicated by the fall in exports from QT
0 to QT
1. In addition to curtailing consumption, the tax generates funds that could be used for
waste management or recycling activities.
As in the case of a production externality, the welfare of market participants in both countries is affected by the environmental policy. By imposing the optimal consumption
tax, the importing country realizes a net welfare gain of areas GHI (terms-of-trade effect) and JK (externality effect). Consumer welfare falls due to higher after-tax prices
(DP
1), producer welfare falls due to lower world prices (WP
1), but the tax revenue gain (areas ABCEFGHI) and the reduction of the externality (areas DJK) more than
offset these losses. The tax revenues could be used to finance the costs of recycling. In the exporting country producers lose areas LMNOP and consumers gain areas
































































































3(2) the composition effect, which characterizes
intersectoral changes reflecting a country’s com-
parative advantage (for example, agricultural
production expands while chemical output de-
clines); and
(3) the technique effect, which portrays changes
in production methods due to trade liberalization.
Freer trade generally increases the rate of economic
growth, which can harm the environment if polluting
activity increases with growth but can improve the
environment if resources are reallocated to less polluting
activity or if growth leads to the adoption of environ-
mentally friendly technology. Economic growth is also
recognized as a crucial factor in increasing the demand
for environmental quality. Consequently, just as the
implementation of agricultural and trade policy creates a
complicated set of environmental distortions, reforming
agricultural and trade policies generates an equally
complicated set of environmental responses. As Dean
(1992) states, “...trade liberalization...will undoubtedly
have some impact on the use of natural resources and
the extent of environmental degradation. However, the
type of impact is not predictable a priori” (p. 25).
Trade Reform—GATT and NAFTA
The GATT agreement and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) illustrate the themes com-
mon to the debate on the linkages between free trade
and environmental quality. The Uruguay Round GATT
agreement aims to reduce trade barriers multilaterally
across a broad range of products. NAFTA’s objective is
to liberalize trade in goods and services and reformulate
foreign investment policies in the United States, Mexico,
and Canada. Both trade agreements raise several envi-
ronmental issues: GATT establishes rules on issues
relating to food, health, and safety standards, while
NAFTA establishes the importance of international
environmental agreements; renounces the relaxation of
health, safety, and environmental measures for attracting
foreign investment; addresses food safety, animal and
plant health concerns, and other product-standard issues;
and is sensitive to environmental issues in dispute settle-
ment provisions. Both sets of contracting parties involved
Tuna-Dolphin Cases
In September 1990, the United States
banned imports of tuna from Mexico,
Panama, and Ecuador. This embargo
was the result of the U.S. Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act (MMPA), which
sets dolphin protection standards for
the domestic fishing fleet and for inter-
national fishing boats that harvest
yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical
Pacific Ocean. The eastern tropical Pa-
cificissingledoutbecausethisiswhere
schools of tuna swim together with
schoolsofdolphins.Traditionally,fish-
ermen would watch for dolphins
coming up for air. When spotted, they
would cast their nets out, assuming that
thereweretunabelow,anddragthenets
until they were full.
The 1972 MMPA was amended by
Congress in 1984 and 1988. It now
requires all nations exporting tuna to
the United States to document that they
have adopted  a dolphin  conservation
program comparable to that of the
United States It also requires the inci-
dentaldolphintakerateofforeignships
to be no greater than 125 percent of the
U.S. take rate. The MMPA further im-
poses an intermediary embargo ban-
ning tuna imports from countries that
import tuna from those subject to a pri-
mary embargo by the United States
Thus, if the EU is importing tuna from
Mexico and there is a U.S. embargo on
Mexican tuna, the United States will
not import tuna from the EU. Also, it
allows tuna products to bear the label
“dolphin safe” if MMPA practices are
followed.
The tuna embargo had the largest effect
on Mexico, because it is the largest
fisher in the eastern tropical Pacific. In
January 1991, Mexico filed a protest
with the GATT to evaluate whether
MMPA’s embargo and labeling re-
quirements violate GATT rules. The




import embargo could be justified be-
cause the GATT allows for the
protection of animal health or exhaust-
ible natural resources. However, the
GATT ruled on  the  side  of  Mexico,
finding that the GATT required a com-
parison of product standards, not har-
vesting or processing methods, and that
a contracting party (the United States)
cannot use trademeasures to enforceits
own laws outside of its jurisdiction.
Therefore, the United States could not
embargo Mexican tuna imports. Mex-
ico did not press the GATT council for
a final decision, so the panel decision
was not formally adopted.
However, in May 1994 the same issue
was raised by the EU (an intermediary
in tuna trade) and heard in front of a
GATT panel. Again thepanelruledthat
the U.S. boycott was illegalbecausethe
GATT does not allow trade bans based
on production methods. This second
ruling was considered to be more “en-
vironmentally friendly” because the
ruling recognized the legitimacy of ex-
traterritorial measures. Daniel Esty (a
former NAFTA negotiator for EPA)
claims that the ruling implicitly recog-
nizes the right of the United States to
takeactionin defenseof wildlife(Char-
novitz, 1994; Wall Street Journal, May
23, 1994 ).
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to examine or monitor the environmental impact asso-
ciated with post-reform changes in crop mix, regional
production patterns, and land and variable input use.
While NAFTA may be more sensitive to environmental
concerns than the GATT agreement, it does not ad-
dress the broad-based domestic and transboundary
environmental issues that are not related to trade among
the three signatories. Rather, the signatories established
three other mechanisms for addressing transboundary
issues: the North American Agreement on Environ-
mental Cooperation (NAAEC), the establishment of a
Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC),
and a North American Development Bank (NADB).
NAAEC may be the most far-reaching mechanism, as it
establishes new institutional structures and rules for
promoting environmental cooperation, multilateral dis-
cussion, and public participation. It has the potential to
generate a continuing evolution of environmental policy
change. In NAAEC, the contracting parties also reaffirm
their commitment to improve national enforcement of
each country’s laws relating to environmental protection
and natural resource issues. Nevertheless, each country
maintains its sovereignty over domestic environmental
policies (Ballenger and Krissoff, 1996). The purpose of
the BECC is to approve environmental improvement
projects in the U.S.-Mexico border region. These projects
will be funded through the NADB.
Trade Policies, Agricultural Policies,
and Environmental Quality
Within the context of agricultural trade policy reform,
the most important characteristic of a policy is the degree
to which it distorts trade. In agriculture, trade distor-
tions arise from both domestic and trade policies. A
common problem in agriculture is the use of a variety of
trade and domestic policies to intervene in agricultural
markets while tariffs are used less frequently (Schwartz,
Magiera, and Mervenne, 1988). Consequently, it is often
difficult to separate trade policy from domestic policy, as
trade goals are often achieved through domestic policy
instruments or domestic goals are achieved through
trade instruments. Economists must understand how
distorting policies affect the environment to assess how
environmental quality is affected by trade reform. Econo-
mists clarify the effects of those policies by examining
their effects on crop mix, input use, technological
change, and investment in the agricultural sector.
Trade and agricultural policies subject to reform can be
divided into broad classes: pricing policies, income
policies, marketing subsidies, and structural subsidies
(table 1). Pricing policies, which are used to raise or
lower producer returns to farming, also affect crop
mix, the location of production, and input use—all of
which directly and indirectly affect environmental
quality (Miranowski, Hrubovcak, and Sutton, 1991).
For example, pricing policies, predominantly found in
higher income countries, typically raise domestic prices
relative to world prices, and these higher prices may
encourage chemical overuse, mechanization, and land
conversion—all of which can harm the environment.
In contrast, some low-income countries protect con-
sumers through low food prices that effectively tax
farmers and discourage production, which can improve
the rural environment by holding production below its
free market level (table 2). Artificially low agricultural
prices, however, may discourage sustainable farming
practices and may encourage migration to urban centers,
placing environmental stress on heavily populated areas.
Table 1—Instruments potentially affected
by liberalizing trade policy
Policy Instruments
Border measures and price supports:





F Quantitative restrictions Import/export quotas
Voluntary export quotas
Licensing restrictions
F Qualitative restrictions Labeling standards
Safety and sanitary regulations
Quality standards














Producer levies Taxes on output to reduce







Source: Economic Research Service, USDA, based on data
adapted from Schwartz, Magiera, and Mervenne (1988).
Exploring Linkages Among Agriculture, Trade, and the Environment / AER-738 Economic Research Service / USDA v 15Pricing policies and income supports have other, less
obvious effects. For example, commodity price supports
are capitalized into land values, which can result in input
intensification as land prices increase relative to the
prices of other inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.
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Farmers who substitute lower priced chemicals for land
may contribute to water and soil degradation and in-
crease concerns about food and farm worker safety,
although degradation due to extensification may be
reduced. Input intensification can also occur when land
is required to be set aside (set-aside programs have been
commonly used in the United States in conjunction with
pricing policies). Set-asides induce scarcity of land,
which increases land prices relative to the prices of
other inputs; relatively higher land prices also act to
slow natural exit from the sector. Consequently, gov-
ernment intervention increases the use of inputs and
natural resources.
Pricing and income policies can provide further incen-
tives to crop intensively. For example, deficiency
payments in the United States were determined by base
acreage, which is a farmer’s historic acreage planted
to program crops such as corn and wheat. Once base
acreage was established, farmers had to continue to
plant program crops to maintain their eligibility for de-
ficiency payments. Consequently, farmers had little
incentive to experiment with crop rotations that may
be more environmentally friendly. Recognizing these
constraints, the 1990 farm bill introduced the concept
of flexible base acreage that permits farmers to plant a
portion of their base acreage to certain allowed crops
while protecting their historical base acreage. The 1996
farm bill (Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act)
extends this flexibility by allowing farmers to plant
any program crop on base acres.
Crop yield was the second component in the computa-
tion of deficiency payments. Prior to 1990, deficiency
payments were based on the higher of average yield
for the farmer’s county or, if the farmer could provide
proof, his/her own yield. Consequently, the farmer tried
to increase yields to raise deficiency payments and hence
tended to use more nonland inputs, including more agri-
cultural chemicals (see Cochrane and Runge, 1992, for a
discussion of U.S. agricultural policies). Legislation in
1990 changed the yield basis to a “farm program pay-
ment yield,” which effectively froze yields for payment
purposes at their 1986 level, thus cutting the tie between
yield increases and larger government payments. In the
1996 farm bill, deficiency payments are eliminated,
severing the link between income support, farm prices,
and input decision making (Young and Shields, 1996).
Input subsidies, which reduce the cost of chemicals, irri-
gation, or credit, can also have negative environmental
effects. Subsidized chemical prices can encourage chemi-
cal overuse, which can lead to surface and groundwater
pollution, soil contamination, eutrophication, reduced
soil fertility, food contamination, and human exposure
to chemicals. Overuse or improper use of irrigation can
lead to salinization of water and soil, increased nitrate
pollution of ground water, depletion of water supplies,
and contributions to water logging, soil erosion, and
landscape degradation (table 3). A number of develop-
ing countries provided fertilizer subsidies (Kenya and
Mexico, for example), but these policies have been
largely eliminated in the 1990’s.
Environmental Effects of Trade Reform
Most economists generally recognize that trade reform
results in economic gain. These gains include “improved
resource allocation; access to better technologies, inputs
and intermediate goods; greater domestic competition;
an economy better able to take advantage of economies
of scale and scope; the creation of an environment
conducive to growth” (Dornbusch, 1992). In the longer
Table 2—Government intervention
in agricultural markets, 1992 selected examples
Region/country Total PSE Share of PSE

















Note: Producer Subsidy Equivalents (PSE’s) are aggregate
measures of support that summarize the effects of a variety of
government programs in a single number. A PSE represents the
lump sum compensation that would be required to maintain sector
income if government policies that affect agricultural markets were
eliminated, assuming constant world prices and fixed output. A
negative PSE represents a tax on producers. The total PSE is the
net dollar sum transfer to producers, while the share of PSE is the
total PSE divided by the producer’s value of production.
1Source: OECD, 1994.
2Source: Economic Research Service, 1994.
12“Intensification” usually refers to a high ratio of nonland inputs
to land and is sometimes used to describe agricultural production
characterized by a heavy reliance on chemicals. Extensification, on
the other hand, occurs when land is substituted for scarce labor,
chemicals, or capital and the land-to-nonland input ratio rises.
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creased investment and savings rates and increased
economic activity and/or the production of a new
good, the introduction of a new method of production,
or the opening of a new market (Dornbusch, 1992).
Conceptual Linkages: Policy Reform Effects
on Environmental Quality
The environmental effects of trade reform are not easily
identifiable. In the short and medium term, trade reform
improves market access for goods previously governed
by quantity restrictions (such as quotas and other non-
tariff barriers) and realigns domestic prices closer to
world prices. Resource reallocation occurs as prices
adjust in the post-reform period. As prices change,
farmers respond by changing their crop mix, altering
input use, buying or selling land, and investing in new
machinery. In countries where reform leads to an in-
crease in producer prices, farmers will respond by
increasing output. Increased producer prices can lead to
more intensive or extensive use of existing lands through
land clearing or deforestation. But it is unclear if trade
reform leads to more extensive land use for all countries
due to constraints on land availability and relatively
cheap chemical inputs that could be substituted for
land. On the other hand, trade reform that leads to a
decline in producer prices (relative to pre-reform levels)
can reduce the pressure on land resources and/or reduce
the use of agricultural chemicals. Environmental quality
may also be affected by the general equilibrium effects
of trade reform; if reform occurs in many sectors or
substantially influences factor returns, labor and capital
may move in or out of agriculture, depending on the
relative, post-reform returns to these factors of production.
In the United States, the effects of multilateral trade
reform on environmental quality have been further
complicated by the use of annual land set-aside require-
ments to control supply and by the use of long-term
land retirement programs such as the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP), which pays farmers to retire
land (usually for 10 years) to meet conservation and
environmental goals. Under the 1996 farm bill, CRP
contracts can be extended and new areas enrolled. If
multilateral trade reform increases the foreign demand
for U.S. commodities, prices increase. Increased demand
and higher prices create incentives to bring previously
idled land back into production. Much of this land is
highly erodible or highly vulnerable to chemical leaching.
Changes in the relative prices of commodities can also
have environmental effects through regional shifts in
production and through incentives created for environ-
mentally friendly crop rotations. For example, high-cost
fruit and vegetable producers in the United States may
find it difficult to compete with Mexican producers who
benefit from increased market access due to NAFTA.
These U.S. farmers may find it more profitable to pro-
duce other commodities, which may be more (or less)
chemical intensive or land using. In another example,
should the price of corn increase relative to soybeans,
farmers may be less likely to retain soybeans in their
rotations, losing the nitrogen-fixing benefits of soybeans.
There is no single theoretical methodology that can
embody all of the environmental implications of freer
trade. Our framework shows that trade policy reform
can augment output, alter input mixes, and deteriorate
or improve environmental quality depending on the new
input mix and technology (fig. 7). Anderson (1992a)
uses a stylized analytical model to examine how eco-
nomic welfare is affected as countries with environmental
externalities in production and consumption liberalize
trade. He shows that the economic welfare effects of
freer trade are ambiguous, but welfare can be improved
if the negative environmental externalities are internal-
ized through environmental policies. Lopez (1992a)
uses a different approach to focus on the growth effects
Table 3—Potential negative environmental
consequences of agricultural production,
selected examples
Practice Consequences
Irrigation Salinization of water and soil
Increased potential for nitrate pollution
of ground water




Reduction of ecological diversity
Fertilizer use Nitrate leaching into soils and water
Eutrophication
Reduced soil fertility
Pesticide use Food contamination
Farmworker exposure to chemicals
Water and soil contamination




Degradation of water systems
Erosion
Machinery use Compaction of soil
Reduced soil productivity
Soil and landscape degradation
Disturbance of soil ecosystems
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA, compiled from
1990 FAO data.
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to show that environmental degradation declines under
unilateral trade liberalization as long as environmental
costs are internalized; however, the environmental effects
are unambiguously negative if environmental externali-
ties are not internalized. In a related paper, Lopez
(1992b) focuses on the effects of freer trade in poorer
countries. He argues that trade reform in many devel-
oping countries raises the price of agricultural goods
relative to the price of nonagricultural goods, which
increases agriculture’s profitability and attracts labor
and capital into the sector. Production increases on the
extensive margin, that is, liberalization raises incentives
to clear forested land and produce in marginal areas.
Empirical Estimates
Accurate empirical estimates of the environmental conse-
quences of trade policy reform are difficult to obtain
for many reasons. Foremost, it is extremely difficult
to model actual water or soil quality due to lack of
physical data and an understanding of how economic
activity affects physical variables. Additionally, trade
reform is rarely confined to agricultural trade reform
and will affect other sectors with an accompanying ad-
justment in the mix of national output. Resources may
move out of agriculture into manufacturing or services
or vice versa. The overall environmental effect of freer
trade depends on the general equilibrium effects, which
could be in the opposite direction of what occurs in any
one sector (agriculture’s contribution to environmental
degradation may decline while manufacturing’s contri-
bution may increase). Failure to account for the general
equilibrium effects of trade could miscalculate the aggre-
gate environmental consequences.
Several recent empirical studies quantify the effects of
trade liberalization (or domestic policy reform) on envi-
ronmental quality. As with most empirical models, the
studies we reviewed vary in terms of country, product,
and sector coverage; type and degree of liberalization;
baseline assumptions; substitutability among inputs and
outputs; and the degree to which environmental vari-
ables are included. Using a partial equilibrium trade
model (manufacturing and service sectors excluded),
Anderson (1992b) estimates that under multilateral
trade liberalization, world food production and prices
change little and production declines in developed
countries are offset by production increases in poorer
countries. Due to the level of aggregation, Anderson







































Policy reforms and environmental quality
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
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veloped countries falls substantially due to declines in
production in these countries; while the increase in
production in poorer countries is achieved through greater
use of labor, rather than chemicals. In Anderson’s model,
world chemical use declines. Additionally, meat and
milk production relocate from developed countries,
where livestock production is grain-based, to poorer
countries with less intensive pasture-based livestock
sectors. Anderson’s results also indicate that deforesta-
tion in developing countries is unlikely to accelerate
due to trade liberalization because the supply of land
is relatively unresponsive to changes in output price.
Lutz (1990) argues that multilateral trade liberalization
lowers commodity prices in developed countries, reduc-
ing agricultural production and associated environmental
degradation. International price variability is also in-
creased, which increases incentives to diversify the crop
mix. However, higher prices from trade liberalization
in poorer countries induce expanded production with
accompanying increases in land and chemical use and
decreases in environmental quality.
Studies that explicitly account for changes in soil and
water quality due to policy reform are typically micro-
oriented and often lack multiple-country coverage or
intersectoral trade-offs, primarily because the environ-
mental and economic effects of policy reform are region-
specific and depend critically on site-specific land, cli-
mate, and farm structure characteristics. For example,
Painter and Young (1992) focus on two U.S. regions, the
North Carolina Coastal Plain and the Washington-Idaho
Palouse to assess how policy reform (decoupling or
program removal) affects soil erosion and water quality.
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Figure 7—This figure illustrates some of the complex interactions among policy changes, input use, land use, and environmental
quality. The upper right-hand quadrant shows the relationship between inputs and output. Each of the output curves, labeled Y,
shows the various combinations of inputs required to produce a given quantity of output. Output remains constant along each
output curve and output curves farther from the origin represent greater output. The shape of an output curve depends on the
degree to which one input can substitute for another.
Prior to any change in agricultural policy, production is defined by the output curve, Y1, with land use oe and chemical use od.
This level of output and input use is congruent with relative input prices indicated by the slope of bc. CD in the upper left-hand
quadrant defines the relationship between chemical use and chemical-based degradation (pesticide contamination and fertilizer
runoff, for example); LD in the lower right-hand quadrant defines the positive relationship between land use and land-based
environmental degradation (such as deforestation or soil erosion). At the initial input levels, chemical degradation is of and land
degradation is og. Total degradation, which is mapped in the lower left-hand quadrant, shows the various combinations of chemical
and land degradation. Like the output curves, total degradation is constant along any of the degradation trade-off curves, D. At
output level Y1, total degradation occurs at h on the degradation trade-off curve D1. An expansion in output due to an increase in
producer prices or an increase in market access can be illustrated by a shift in the production function to Y2. At the higher level
of output, land use increases to om and chemical use increases to ol; these levels correspond to relative input prices indicated
by the slope of jk (which, in this example, are unchanged by trade reform). In this example, the increase in chemical use is greater
than the increase in land use. Chemical degradation increases to on, and land degradation increases to op. When combined, total
degradation increases to q on D2. In this example, output price reform leads to increased production, increased chemical and land
degradation, and increased total degradation.
In many countries, domestic policy reform often accompanies trade reform. For example, Mexico has been reducing input subsidies
(water and fertilizer), mostly to reduce budget outlays and encourage more efficient production. In this figure, reducing chemical
subsidies (such as the fertilizer subsidy) raises the price of chemicals relative to the price of land (land is held fixed in this example).
Higher chemical prices are represented by a rotation in the input price line to sk. As chemical prices increase relative to land
prices, the relatively higher price of chemicals lowers output to Y3 and reduces chemical use to ot and land use to ou. Total
degradation occurs at x, on D3, which is a greater level than under the initial equilibrium but less than when only output prices are
reformed.
1 In the longer run, the relationship between chemical use and degradation can be altered through technological change
in agricultural production (resulting in less intensive production methods) or through technological change in chemicals (resulting
in less polluting chemicals). The latter is illustrated by CD shifting to CD‘, where CD‘ is a new chemical degradation curve that
represents less chemical degradation per unit of chemical used. Although total chemical use remains unchanged, the amount of
chemical degradation declines to y and total degradation declines to z on the D4 degradation curve.
1Removal of pesticide subsidies, for example, could result in the use of more traditional methods or pest control that may be less environmen-
tally damaging. But if traditional methods are not as effective in controlling pests, agricultural productivity can decline and farmers may respond by
cultivating land more intensively relative to pre-reform levels.
13Decoupling is the process of replacing policies that support
farmers based on their production level with income assistance pro-
grams not linked to production. Coupled policies reward or tax pro-
ducers on the marginal unit of production or consumption such that
output or use decisions are directly affected by the policy (Josling,
1992). Decoupled policies remove such incentives.
Exploring Linkages Among Agriculture, Trade, and the Environment / AER-738 Economic Research Service / USDA v 19Their mathematical programming model allows farmers
to select alternative crop rotations as crop prices adjust to
post-reform levels. Their results indicate that when crop-
ping alternatives exist, program removal and decoupling
can encourage planting flexibility, which leads to envi-
ronmentally friendlier (low chemical input) production.
Economic Growth and Environmental Quality
One other environmental issue associated with freer trade
is the implications of economic growth on polluting
activities and the demand for environmental quality.
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, econo-
mists widely recognize that trade reform can be a
positive catalyst for economic growth, but the environ-
mental effects of growth are not always readily apparent.
Some argue that increased production accompanying
economic growth leads to an increase in environmental
degradation associated with additional output. However,
economic growth can also change a country’s output and
input mix, resulting in a more efficient use of resources.
Additionally, economic growth can be accompanied by
an increase in the demand for cleaner technologies and
environmental quality.
Even if growth leads to an increase in polluting pro-
duction in the short run, there may be several factors
that balance the additional costs or improve environ-
mental quality over time. The costs associated with
greater environmental pollution (such as an increase in
nitrates or soil erosion) may be less than the benefits
associated with economic growth (such as higher per
capita income, greater production efficiency, and a more
stable macroeconomy). For some economies, an increase
in pollution is only temporary and is reduced as further
growth occurs. This is generally thought to be the case
for air pollution and pollution with no stock feedback ef-
fects.
14 These types of pollutants can frequently be
controlled by modern technologies that are acquired as
income increases. Further growth may bring no relief
in other cases, however, particularly in industries that
rely on resource stocks (for example, forests, soil depth,
and water). An increase in production caused by eco-
nomic growth can seriously deplete and affect the quality
or quantity of a resource stock, often beyond its regen-
erative ability or assimilative capacity. For instance,
excess withdrawal of water for irrigation has caused
the volume of the Aral Sea to decline by two-thirds in
the last 30 years (World Bank, 1992).
The view that open trade increases economic growth,
therefore increasing the demand for environmental
quality, is commonly used to justify the belief that
free trade brings positive environmental effects. While
there is empirical evidence that higher per capita in-
come is positively correlated with a greater demand for
environmental quality, these estimates are based on
correlations between income and emission levels; the
correlation between income and resource degradation
(such as deforestation, loss of soil nutrients, and loss
of water quality) is less clear and less quantifiable.
15
Several studies have noted an inverted-U relationship
between per capita income and pollution emissions:
emissions increase at low-income levels, but, once in-
come reaches a certain threshold, emissions begin to
decline. Estimates indicate that the demand for environ-
mental quality becomes “important” at income levels
of about $5,000 per capita (Grossman and Krueger,
1991). Antle and Heidebrink (1995), using a different
measure for the demand for environmental quality,
namely the number of parks and forests, find that this
“environmental transition” occurs at lower per capita
levels of income (approximately $1,200-$2,000). Many
high-income countries have already experienced im-
provements in air quality and increases in forested area
and protected habitats (World Bank, 1992). This argu-
ment is further developed by Antle and Trigo (1992).
Their environmental transition hypothesis states: “eco-
nomic growth is likely to be accompanied by environ-
mental degradation at low-income levels but as income
increases, the demand for environmental protection may
bring about a path characterized by both economic
growth and environmental improvement.” Although
preliminary work has been conducted on the role of
economic growth and trade liberalization on environ-
mental quality, more reliable data and studies are needed
to better understand the open trade-environmental
quality linkages.
Special Topics in Trade
and the Environment
WTO contracting parties have a strong interest in:
transparency of health and environmental measures;
packaging and labeling requirements; measures relating to
international environmental agreements; environmental
taxes and charges; harmonization of health, safety, and
environmental measures; and the use of trade instruments
for environmental policy. Areas that may be most rele-
14Stock feedback effects occur when the quality or quantity of a re-
source is affected by production. For example, agricultural produc-
tion can result in soil erosion; soil resources are depleted thus
affecting future production.
15Although new methods of measuring environmental demand
have been developed, these calculations have primarily been applied to
local area studies. On a national basis, the level of emissions is
often still used as a proxy for the demand for environment quality.
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of product and environmental performance standards
and production and processing methods, as well as the
use of trade instruments for environmental policy.
Harmonization of Product
and Environmental Standards
and Production and Processing Methods
Robertson (1992) defines harmonization as the “coordi-
nation of policies and instruments to reduce international
differences and to facilitate international competition.”
Some environmental groups worry that trade agreements
lower national environmental standards (The Economist,
February 27, 1993). Some business representatives favor
harmonization as a means of facilitating trade across
national (or other jurisdictional) boundaries; but they
may also disfavor it should harmonization put their own
firms or industries at a cost disadvantage. Economic
arguments both support and contraindicate harmoniza-
tion in part depending on the unit of analysis.
Harmonization Taxonomy
The concept of harmonization may be applied to several
different types of environmental policies. A discussion of
the economics can be based on a taxonomy that divides
harmonization of standards into three categories: harmoni-
zation of product standards; harmonization of environ-
mental performance standards; and harmonization of
production and processing methods (PPM’s) (table 4).
The harmonization of product standards has already re-
ceived attention in international forums. The basis for
setting product standards pertaining to food safety was a
component of Uruguay Round negotiations over rules
for applying sanitary and phytosanitary (S&P) measures
to imported products. During the S&P negotiations, one
of the issues contracting parties discussed was the pos-
sibility of harmonizing requirements for legal limits on
pesticide residues in foods. Under the negotiated S&P
Agreement (Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures), countries have agreed to
work toward harmonizing food safety and other S&P
requirements based on international standards, guidelines,
and recommendations. For food safety, the relevant
international body establishing scientific bases for stand-
ards is the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CODEX)
(see box—“Codex Alimentarius Commission”). Under
the terms of the S&P Agreement, a country that restricts
imports based on stricter standards than those under
CODEX could be called upon to provide scientific jus-
tification (see box—“Sanitary and Phytosanitary (S&P)
Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)”).
Product packaging and labeling requirements and
guidelines for applying such domestic requirements to
imported products were not discussed in the Uruguay
Round, but these issues have been on the agenda of re-
cent OECD and Committee on Trade and
Environment/WTO meetings. Packaging regulations
pertain to the materials used or the handling of the mate-
rials used in shipping. These regulations might, for
example, require packaging to be recyclable or, if not,
to be returned to the country of origin. Labeling re-
quirements might mandate the provision of certain
nutritional or other consumer information such as the
environmental implications of a product’s life cycle.
“Dolphin safe” labels on tuna cans are an example of
environmental labeling. Other product-related require-
ments might pertain to the procedures that must be
followed for registering a new product, including num-
bers, types, and results of product tests that must be
conducted before a product can be introduced to the
market. Both the nature of those requirements and the
processes that must be followed differ by country.
Table 4—Harmonization taxonomy
Product standards




Food safety Environmental control technology Air quality standards
Packaging content (recyclable) Harvesting methods (purse seine nets)
1 Water quaility standards
Ecolabeling Farming methods (IPM) Soil quality standards
Regulatory processes (registration of






1Purse seine nets have been used to harvest tuna fish. See box, “Tuna-Dolphin Cases,” on p. 14.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
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has also been the subject of multinational talks, particu-
larly when the environmental issue has a transnational
or global dimension (such as protection of the atmos-
phere) such that the benefits of protection are widely
shared across nations. Several International Environ-
mental Agreements (IEA’s) provide for cooperative
approaches to addressing global environmental problems.
The most ambitious IEA’s aim to establish quantitative
performance goals. Existing global IEA’s address pro-
tection of wildlife (endangered species), habitat, oceans,
atmosphere, and hazardous waste disposal. For example,
the 1987 Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer (Montreal Protocol) requires nations to cut con-
sumption of five chlorofluorocarbons and three halons
by 20 percent of their 1986 level by 1994 and by 50
percent of their 1986 level by 1999, with allowance
for increases in consumption by developing countries
(World Resources Institute, 1992).
Harmonizing PPM’s is the category most likely to
generate debate in the WTO and other international fo-
rums. Some have argued that any international effort to
regulate or coordinate PPM’s would infringe on national
sovereignty (Charnovitz, 1991). In one widely publicized
case, a GATT panel sided with Mexico against a U.S.
embargo on Mexican tuna that had been imposed be-
cause of Mexico’s tuna harvesting methods, which were
endangering dolphins (U.S. Congress, Congressional
Research Service, 1991) (see box—“Tuna-Dolphin
Cases,” p. 14). However, different PPM’s, such as low-
input versus chemical-intensive farming, affect the
environment differently and may be easier to monitor
and regulate than environmental performance. Industry
interests are also concerned with how national regula-
tions of PPM’s (for example, requiring the use of certain
environmental control technologies or bans on certain
agricultural chemicals) differ and affect their cost struc-
tures relative to their competitors in other countries.
One potential form of harmonization would make environ-
mental policy instruments more similar among countries.
Nations now take many different approaches to meeting
environmental goals, and, even when performance
standards are similar, policy instruments can differ
markedly. Regulatory approaches are more common in
Codex Alimentarius Commission
The Codex Alimentarius Commission
(CODEX) is a food standards organi-
zation and a subagency of the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organi-
z a t i o n( F A O )a n dW o r l dH e a l t h
Organization (WHO). As of 1994, CO-
DEX is comprised of 146 member
nations and is open to all members of
the FAO and the WHO. CODEX sets
industrialguidelinesforfoodsafetythat
can be voluntarily adopted by its mem-
bers. CODEX seeks to facilitate food
trade while furthering consumer health,
promoting fair practices in food trade,
organizing food standards set by other
international organizations, and ulti-
mately publishing these guidelines in a
Codex Alimentarius.
CODEX consists of 28 subject and
commodity committees that evaluate
and draft Codex Standards and seven
general committees. Various member
countriesactashosttoeachoftheseven
generalcommitteeswhichdecideissues
on pesticide residues, food additives
and environmental contaminants, food
hygiene,analysisandsampling,general
principles, drug residues, and food la-
beling. CODEX members include sci-
entists, technical experts, and
government regulators, with heavy in-
dustry representation and less
representation from environmental and
other public interest groups (Kramer,
1990; FAO, 1994).
Before a food standard or code of prac-
tice is approved for a particular use,
CODEX looks at the volume of inter-
national trade, consumption, and
production of the food product to de-
termine  whether the product needs a
world standard to protect consumers
from health risks and fraud. CODEX
thenhastheappropriatecommitteesub-
mit a draft to member countries
specifying quality, ingredients, sanitary
and labeling requirements, adulteration
limits,foodadditives,andsamplingand
analysis methods.  The committee  re-
vises the draft to include suggestions or
comments and resubmits it to the mem-
ber countries. After it is reviewed, it is
senttoallmembersofCODEX forfinal
approval. If approved, it becomes a Co-
dex Alimentarius Standard or Code of
Practice (Morrison, 1983).
As an example  of CODEX’s role in
international food trade, it has estab-
lished standards for conventional
labeling and regulations to control out-
rageous claims. Food labels have to
contain the name of the food, list of
ingredients in descending order, net
contents and drained weight, country of
origin, date marking and storage in-
structions, lot identification,
manufacturer, and instructions for use.
Thereareguidelinesforanutritionlabel
as well, which include energy value,
content of protein, fat, carbohydrates,
vitamins and minerals, and a general
standard for  food  additives. CODEX
also has recommended international
codes for good hygiene, which cover
production/harvestingmethods(includ-
ing transportation), proper facilities,
personnel hygiene, and hygienic proc-
essing requirements. CODEX hygienic
advisories include hazard analysis criti-
cal control point (HACCP), an
approach that identifies and monitors
processing points where contamination
may take place (FAO, 1994).
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based instruments; some countries provide subsidies,
particularly in the agricultural sector, while others
levy taxes. The OECD has addressed this issue by en-
couraging its members to adopt common principles,
such as the polluter-pays principle, that would underlie
environmental policy design (see footnote 3).
Economic Arguments on Harmonization
Product standards, environmental performance standards,
and PPM’s vary among countries for a number of valid
reasons. An important one is that community demands
for environmental amenities often differ. In other words,
if the production of a good carries with it both a private
(or internal) cost and an external cost (the cost to society
of pollution generated when the good is produced or
consumed), some communities assign this social cost a
higher value than others. Differing income levels may
be an important factor contributing to these differing
community demands. Some argue that richer commu-
nities have a greater capacity and preparedness than
poorer communities to trade off goods consumption
for a cleaner or better-preserved environment, although
this might not mean that poorer communities desire
an improved environment any less (Anderson, 1992a).
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (S&P) Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agree-
ment (S&P Agreement) of the recently
negotiated Uruguay Round provides that
contracting parties may adopt or enforce
S&P measures “necessary” to protect hu-
man, animal, or plant life or health, as
long as they are not applied in a manner
that would arbitrarily or unjustifiably dis-
criminate between countries with similar
conditions or actasa disguisedrestriction
of international trade. Measures must be
based on scientific principles and con-
form with the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, particularly Article
XX(b) (seebox,“GATTArticleXXGen-
eral Exceptions,” p. 30). While these
principles existed before the Uruguay
Round Agreement, the S&P language
more clearly details the rights and obli-
gations of the contracting parties with the
aim of avoiding any new trade barriers.
The S&P Agreement defines S&P meas-
ures as those that protect animal or plant
life or health from the entry or spread of
pests and diseases within the contracting
party’s territory;those that protecthuman
or animal life or health from toxins, con-
taminants, additives, or disease-carrying
organisms found in food, beverages, or
feedstuffs; those that protect human life
or health from diseases carried by ani-
mals,plants,orproductsorfromtheentry
or spread of pests; and those that limit or
prevent other damages from the entry or
spread of pests. These measures can take
the form of  laws, decrees, regulations,
requirements, testing procedures, inspec-
tions, and methods.
Contracting parties must base their meas-
ures on an assessment of the risks,
circumstances,environmentalconditions,
availablescientificevidence,andrelevant
production, testing, and sampling meth-
ods to determine the appropriate level of
S&P protection. Contracting parties must
also try to adopt the least trade-restrictive
measure, taking into account technical
and economic feasibility.
A chief concern surrounding S&P meas-
ures is the negative effect they may have
on trade. As a result, contracting parties
have agreed to work toward harmonizing
S&P measures based on international
standards, guidelines, and recommenda-
tions. These standards, guidelines, and
recommendations are established by the
CODEX for food safety, the International
Office of Epizootics for animal health,
the International Plant  Protection  Con-
vention coupled with regional
organizations for plant health, and other
international organizations identified by
the Committee on Sanitary and Phy-
tosanitary Measures for all other matters.
Under the S&P Agreement, if an export-
ing party “objectively demonstrates” that
itsmeasuresachievetheimportingparty’s
proper level of S&P protection, then the
importing party must acceptthe measures
as equivalent even when they differ. A
contracting party that introduces a meas-
ure with a higher level of protection than
those based  on international standards,
guidelines, and recommendations
must provide scientific justifica-
tion. Contracting parties have also
agreed to address the special needs
of developing countries by allow-
ing longer timeframes for
compliance, providing technical
and financial assistance, and en-
couraging  overall participation in
international organizations.
In addition to the S&P Agreement,
contracting parties negotiated a
Technical Barriers to Trade Agree-
ment (also called the Standards
Code). The TBT Agreement covers
technical requirements relating to
S&P measures such as pesticide
residue limits, inspection require-
ments, and labeling, as well as
packaging,productcontentrequire-
ments, and processing methodsthat
affect the characteristics of the
product. As in the S&P text, the
TBT Agreement calls for contract-
ing parties to use relevant
international standards, but na-
tional standards could be used to
meet “legitimate objectives” in-
cluding protection of the
environment.  However, importers
must be treated the same as domes-
tic producers and the TBT measure
“shall not be more trade restrictive
thannecessaryto fulfillalegitimate
objective” (GATT, 1994 and 1991,
and Charnovitz, 1991).
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of willingness to assume risk of hazard to environmental
or human health.
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Another reason for diverging degrees of environmental
protection may be that different environments have
different “assimilative capacities.” An environment’s
assimilative capacity is measured by its ability to take
wastes and convert them back into harmless or ecologi-
cally useful products (Pearce and Turner, 1990). The
steps a community takes to control soil erosion, for ex-
ample, may depend on its perception of the ability of
the environment to assimilate erosion sediments before
commercial fishing, recreation activities, or fish popu-
lations are threatened.
In economic terms, if demand for and supply of envi-
ronmental amenities differ among nations, then the
optimal level of pollution or environmental externality
will also differ and harmonization will not make eco-
nomic sense. The socially optimal level of environmental
quality is that for which the cost to society of the last
unit of environmental damage (the marginal social
damage) is exactly equal to the cost in terms of pollu-
tion abatement expenditures of removing that last unit
(the marginal abatement cost).
17 At a higher level of
pollution, the marginal social cost of pollution is higher
than the cost of abating the pollution, so society will
usually choose to reduce pollution. At a lower level of
pollution, the cost of abating the pollution is higher than
the value to society of abatement, so society will usu-
ally choose to allow pollution to increase. If pollution
is at some nonoptimal level, then society’s resources
are inefficiently allocated between private goods and
pollution and total social welfare could be enhanced
with an environmental policy that corrects the balance.
However, harmonization forces pollution levels to be
the same among countries, thereby moving countries
away from their optimal pollution level (fig. 8).
Two countries might have similar environmental stand-
ards but different pollution tax rates. For example, two
countries might have like standards for water quality
but might tax (or limit) the use of water pollutants, like
nitrogen fertilizers, at very different rates. Can both
countries’ tax rates be optimal from national perspec-
tives? The answer is yes, for several possible reasons.
One is that producers in the two countries may respond
very differently to the same tax. In one country a high
tax might be required in order to limit nitrogen use
sufficiently; the other country may have success with a
lower tax. A second reason is that the environment may
be more vulnerable to damage from nitrogen use in one
country than in the other. This may be because of the
relative permeabilities of the soils on which nitrogen is
applied or the proximity of the nitrogen-using areas to
water supplies. More vulnerable regions, everything else
equal, may require higher tax rates.
Under NAFTA, and similarly in the S&P and the Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade sections in GATT, comparability
of standards is to be promoted through the application
of the following principles:
· Transparency—the disclosure of methods used in
formulating and adopting health-related measures, the
dispensing of information and advance, notification
to the public, and the opportunity for public comment;
· Equivalency—the recognition that different methods
may be used to achieve the same level of health pro-
tection;
· Consistency—avoiding arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
tinctions across commodities in choosing the level
of risk or the adoption of S&P and standard-
related measures; and
· Regionalism—applying risk-assessment criteria on
the degree of risk for an area within a region rather
than the whole country being risk-free or not risk-free.
In sum, simple economic constructs suggest that harmoni-
zation may not be an efficient international policy.
Differing national preferences for private versus public
goods consumption may be a key factor underlying the
international distribution of production and in establishing
global patterns of trade. However, simple economic
models abstract from many real world complexities.
For example, they assume that social damage functions
are known and represent the true (aggregated) prefer-
ences of each country’s citizenry. Citizens’ preferences
are not always well known or well represented through
the policymaking process.
Economic theory and concepts may also offer some
support for harmonization, particularly for the case of
product standards designed to protect health, safety, or
16An analog exists in the arguments regarding differences between
Federal and State standards for environmental quality in the United
States. The argument could also be posed in an intergenerational
context. Wealthier communities may be more willing to sacrifice
economic activity today in order to preserve the environment for the
benefit of future generations; poorer communities may find that the
sacrifice would be too costly.
17The cost of reducing pollution can be measured either in terms
of foregone output and consumption of private goods or in terms of
expenditures necessary to reduce pollution. If output reductions are
the only way to reduce pollution, then the value of lost output
equals the abatement cost. See Pearce and Turner (1990) for a dis-
cussion of how these two concepts are related.
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by country, firms that export to many countries may
face significant transactions costs in acquiring informa-
tion from many individual sources. Tailoring product
characteristics to meet the unique requirements of many
markets may be costly and hinder the ability of such
firms to take full advantage of the economies of scale
that international trade can offer. These costs are passed
on, at least partially, to consumers. When these trans-
action and tailoring costs are taken into account, the
benefits to the world consumer of product standards
harmonization may be an empirical question. For ex-
ample, there may be types of harmonization—like
regulatory requirements for testing bioengineered prod-
ucts or standards for certifying a product is organic or
environmentally friendly— that can improve interna-
tional market performance by lowering transactions costs
and improving the quality of consumer information.
An economic case for harmonization of environmental
performance standards can also be made when con-
sumers of the environmental amenity are distributed
across national boundaries, but the actions of one nation
can affect consumption of the amenity in other nations.
The benefits of protecting the ozone layer and genetic
diversity, for example, are broadly shared, although
countries’ abilities to contribute to a global effort may
vary markedly. Water quality could also benefit from
multinational standards because waterways and water
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Dollars
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Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Figure 8—This figure illustrates the social welfare loss to two countries when they harmonize their pollution levels away from their
initial optimal levels. It shows marginal social damage functions (denoted MSD) and marginal abatement cost functions (denoted
MAC) for countries 1 and 2. At first each country chooses its own optimal level of environmental damage (ED): ED1 and ED2.
Country 2 prefers a higher level because of two factors: (1) for any given level of pollution, its abatement costs are higher, and
(2) for any given level of environmental damage the social costs are lower. Later, the two countries compromise by harmonizing
their standards at environmental damage level EDh. At this harmonized level country 1 produces an inefficiently large amount of
pollution and country 2 produces an inefficiently small level. The total social welfare loss is the shaded area bounded by the two
countries’ curves.
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eratively, economizing valuable resources. Nonetheless,
negotiations can be long and difficult due to differing
preferences and financial resources among countries, and
the difficulty of defining a consistent set of performance
indicators to be applied across countries. Differing
preferences and financial resources among countries
may suggest a role for financial transfers from richer
to poorer countries. Similarly, differing production
technologies across countries suggest a role for flexible
approaches, such as tradable pollution permits, to realize
jointly set goals.
The harmonization of PPM’s is the type of harmoniza-
tion most difficult to support based on economic
concepts, particularly when the environmental effects of
the production technology are confined within national
boundaries. For example, animal waste pollution in
European countries may require an EU solution but
pose no environmental issues in North America. Even
when transboundary effects are present (like when water
pollution flows from one country to another) economic
arguments are likely, based on efficiency grounds, to
support environmental agreements that emphasize per-
formance rather than mandate or prohibit particular
production techniques. Regulating practices can freeze
the development of new and preferred technologies for
the future. However, environmental performance (or the
contribution of individual firms or producers to perform-
ance) can be very difficult to monitor and measure,
particularly where nonpoint source pollution is involved.
Many harmonization issues potentially addressed in in-
ternational negotiations are likely to be pertinent for
agricultural production, food processing, and food and
agricultural product trade. Today’s food and agricultural
products are widely traded and traditional impediments
to trade generally low, so there may be growing inter-
est in moving toward the harmonization of standards
and technical requirements applied to these products.
Many environmental concerns of global interest, such
as biodiversity and habitat preservation, are related to
agricultural production.
Use of Trade Measures
for Environmental Purposes
While international coordination to protect the environ-
ment can be achieved through voluntary negotiation,
some nations have called for more forceful approaches—
including trade sanctions and other restrictions. Future
WTO talks will likely explore the extent to which its
rules will allow a country (1) to use trade actions to
force protection of the environment outside its own
boundaries or (2) to correct for competitive differences
in environmental standards. While some countries may
wish to explore the use of trade actions for these purposes,
current WTO rules prohibit making market access de-
pendent on changes in domestic environmental policies
or practices in an exporting country (GATT, 1992).
Most countries discourage using forceful approaches,
such as unilateral action that restricts market access or
trade actions based on competitive concerns about dif-
fering environmental standards, to influence
environmental policy. WTO considers environ-
mental standards to be similar to other standards such
as labor practices and education policies for which no
special duties are allowed.
Trade Measures to Control Pollution
Generated by a Trading Partner
Economists studying the trade and environment debate
have recently revisited the theoretical role of trade pol-
icy in addressing environmental concerns (For a more
detailed discussion of this topic, see Ludema and
Wooton, 1992; Markusen, 1975; and Panagariya, Pal-
mer, Oates, and Krupnick, 1993). A tariff may be a
viable tool for a country wishing to control transboundary
externalities emanating from the production of goods
in another country, particularly if it cannot directly in-
fluence the other country’s domestic taxes, subsidies or
regulations. For example, a tariff imposed by a (large)
importing country on the exporter’s polluting good can,
under certain conditions, result in a welfare improve-
ment in the importing country and an improvement in
environmental quality (fig. 9). An industrial example
involves a factory producing export goods as well as
emissions that cross the border into the importing
country. An agricultural example might be the case of
an upstream agricultural country polluting the water
of a downstream country due to sedimentary runoff or
chemical leaching.
Several important concerns related to the use of trade
measures to achieve international environmental objec-
tives exist. One is the costs of such measures relative
to alternative strategies. For example, country 1 could
encourage adoption of environmentally friendlier prac-
tices among farmers in country 2 by providing technical
support. This alternative could be more cost-effective than
country 1 imposing a tariff on country 2, particularly
if the pollution of concern is coming from a particular
locality and not from all producing regions, or if there is
a likelihood of trade policy retaliation. A trade measure
is likely to affect all production because it can have its
most important effect on production not even located
near the specific polluted area. However, a technical
exchange program can be targeted to production regions
most responsible for the pollution.





















































Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Figure 9—This figure shows the two-country, open economy case, along with an additional panel illustrating a transboundary effluent. Production in the exporting country￿
does not affect environmental quality at home but does generate externalities in the importing country. The production of commodity Z in the exporting country and the￿
level of environmental quality in the importing country consistently decline in panel 4. In the absence of international cooperation, the importing country may choose to￿
impose a tariff to mitigate the pollution concern. The tariff would cause the domestic price in the importing country to rise (WP  to DP , panel 3) and the level of imports￿
demanded to fall (panel 2). The excess demand curve shifts downward (ED  to ED ), lowering world price and the price in the exporting country (WP   to WP  , panel 1).￿
Production in the exporting country drops (Q   to Q  ), and the associated externalities affecting the importing country decline (environmental quality increases from EQ￿










     If production of the good in the importing country also generates an environmental externality internal to that country, then imposition of the tariff as above will reduce damage done by for-￿


































































































7A second concern relates more broadly to the potential
effectiveness of a trade measure for reducing transboun-
dary problems. Suppose the world market is composed of
other buyers of country 2’s product as well. A unilateral
action by country 1 may not affect country 2’s produc-
tion level enough to sufficiently curtail transboundary
pollution. Country 1 may have to seek the cooperation
of all or most importing countries. If other countries do
not share country 2’s environmental problems, they may
not be willing to cooperate in applying a trade measure.
A cooperative approach to environmental policy is most
likely where all involved countries benefit from the en-
vironmental outcome. Protection of the atmosphere, air
quality, genetic biodiversity, and endangered species are,
for example, broadly (although differently) shared envi-
ronmental interests that can benefit from multinational
cooperative approaches like IEA’s.
18 IEA’s sometimes
do involve trade barriers, but participants are likely to
give considerable attention to their appropriateness and
cost effectiveness compared with other measures (see
box—“Current Uses of Trade Measures in International
Environmental Agreements (IEA’s)”). Alternatives to
trade measures might include financial transfers to pol-
luters from those that benefit most from pollution
abatement; internationally traded pollution permits; and
programs designed to give local producers stronger
incentives to protect their natural resources (see box—
“Community Resource Management”). When interna-
tional programs are efficiently designed, the world’s
economies give up less in terms of economic well-
being in order to achieve environmental goals.
Trade Measures to Protect
the Global Commons
Some trade measures involve the use of sanctions or
measures to influence foreign production levels or meth-
ods that are perceived to degrade the “global commons”
(including oceans and the atmosphere) or global public
goods (such as biodiversity). Trade measures to protect
endangered species or animal health and safety—such
as bans on tuna caught with driftnets, bans on fur caught
with steel leg-hold traps, or bans on poultry exports
because of controversial production methods—might
also be grouped here.
In considering the use of trade measures to protect the
global commons and global environmental goods, the
international community may have the option of alter-
natives that offer more effective incentives for sound
environmental management. In the case of biodiversity
protection, for example, incentives for wise habitat
management might correct institutional failures, such as
18See discussion in previous section on harmonization for an ex-
planation of why countries price environmental amenities differently.
Current Uses of Trade Measures in International Environmental Agreements (IEA’s)
GATT has estimated that approxi-
mately17IEA’scontaintrademeasures
addressingissuesfromendangeredspe-
cies to hazardous wastes (GATT,
1992). Trade measures can accomplish
environmental goals in a variety of
ways. They can persuade countries to
adopt IEA’s and environmental stand-
ards, take away a country’s economic
incentivestoengageinenvironmentally
detrimental activity, and impede one
country from frustrating the environ-
mental efforts of another.
The Montreal Protocol on Substances
That Deplete the Ozone Layer (Proto-
col), the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Dis-
posal, and the Convention on
International Trade in EndangeredSpe-
cies (CITES) are all examples of IEA’s
that incorporate trade measures. Pres-
ently, the Protocol restricts the import
and export of chlorofluorocarbons and
other chemicals that deplete the ozone
layer, as well as products that contain
these substances. The Protocol has also
proposed a process restriction on prod-
ucts made using ozone depleting
substances. The Basel Convention
placesrestrictionsontradebetweensig-
natories and countries that lack
regulations for proper disposal of haz-
ardous and toxic wastes. Similarly,
CITES prohibits the trade of endan-
gered and threatened species and
products that originate from them, such
as ivory.
The principal concern surrounding the
use of trade measures in IEA’s is envi-
ronmental effectiveness and economic
efficiency. For example, since the
CITES ivory trade moratorium, ele-
phant poaching has dropped
significantly.Yettherecentdebateover
proposed trade restrictions on tropical
timber imports and exports exemplifies
the difficulty of predicting the effec-
tiveness  of trade measures. Those in
support of trade restrictions on tropical
timber feel trade restrictions will pre-
serve genetic diversity. Those against
restrictions argue that they will be in-
effective since more than 80 percent of
tree cutting in developing countries re-
sults from agricultural land-clearing
and fuel wood harvesting. Others feel
that, although a total ban on tropical
timber exports might not be effective,
trade restrictions would be appropriate
in those countries exporting a greater
percent of their tropical timber (Office
of Technology Assessment, 1992).
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destruction. The programs of the World Bank and other
international development institutions already confront
many such environmental problems with global dimen-
sions, suggesting a role for constructive dialogue
between such institutions and the WTO’s Committee on
Trade and Environment (World Bank, 1992). Because
the international community will at times agree to use
trade measures to enforce provisions of IEA’s, a key
issue of international law is the relationship of such
multilateral agreements to countries’ obligations under
the WTO. Developing formal mechanisms for IEA
consultations with WTO may help in designing trade
measures that are least restrictive.
Trade Actions Taken Against Imported
Products Not Meeting Domestic Standards
Product standards, as discussed above, may differ by
country for very legitimate reasons, and these differ-
ences can be the source of significant trade frictions.
Because previous GATT negotiations significantly
lowered traditional trade barriers, nations may now
focus on addressing the trade effects of differences in
product standards and regulations. Product standards
are often set to address the asymmetric information
and uncertainty problem or consumption externalities.
Examples of trade actions associated with imported
products might include banning imported wines not
meeting domestic tolerances for fungicide residues or
banning food products not meeting domestic labeling
or packaging requirements.
The WTO is relatively accepting of a nation’s right to
require all products, whether domestically produced or
imported, to meet national standards for health and safety
of consumers, plants, animals, and the environment
(see box—“GATT Article XX General Exceptions”).
For instance, a recent GATT panel ruled in favor of U.S.
regulations requiring a corporate average fuel efficiency
(CAFE) standard, luxury tax, and gas guzzler tax, which
the EU had protested as discriminatory against imports.
Community Resource Management
Successful community resource man-
agement may be a key component in
preservingthenaturalresourcesofdevel-
oping countries. Many governments,
however, have taken control over natu-
ral resources without the specialized
knowledge, presence, or personal inter-
estthatlocalcommunitiespossess.This
has led to overexploitation of natural
resources by outside entities and com-
munity members alike. With security
of tenure, protection, and adequate
authority over land use, communities
may be best able to allocate resources
efficiently (Panayotou, 1993).
In India an experiment was conducted
in which villagers were given forest-re-
lated jobs in an effort to prevent
deforestation. Villagers were responsi-
bleforplantingseedsfortreesandgrass
and protecting the forest from en-
croachment. Villagers were also
awarded 25 percent of the selling price
of mature trees. This experiment led to
long-term forest management, leaving
both the villagers and the forests in a
better position. Since then, other vil-
lages have employed the same methods
successfully (Panayotou, 1993).
Likewise, communal tenure in Papua
New Guinea has resulted in sustainable
and productive use of land. Communal
lands, governed by local customs, are
neither publicly nor privately owned.
Rather, families have the right to plant
crops freely, while the clan maintains
therighttotransferpropertyownership.
Clearer ownership rights and security
of tenure have allowed community
members to use forest land efficiently.
Companies seeking logging rights deal
directlywithclanmemberswhoareless
interested than the government in gain-
ing short-term profits over long-term
sustainability. As a result,  out of 46
million hectares of forest land, only 6
million havebeen clearedforotherpur-
poses (Panayotou, 1993).
Community resource management has
also been used to solve problems such
as overgrazing,overfishing, and endan-
gered species. For example, in Alanya,
Turkey, an effective rotational system
of fishing was created by local fisher-
men to reduce overfishing. Fishing
locations are labeled and spread out
along the shore from September to
May. Fishermen areassigned alocation
and rotate each day to the next location.
This allows fishermen to use large nets
withoutinterferenceandprovidesequal
opportunity to fish at choice locations.
The rotational system is heavily sup-
ported because it benefits everyone
except those who once monopolized
(Berkes, 1986).
Many feel that when communities con-
trol their own resources they are more
apt to preserve them. For example, op-
ponents of the CITES ivory trade
moratorium who favor community re-
source management argue   that
“well-managed exploitation” of ele-
phants will lead to species preservation
since communities will gain long-term
financial benefits. Although commu-
nityresourcemanagementhasmetwith
mixed success, communities that have
been successful suggest that an effec-
tive program  of community resource
management can be the best source of
sustainable development (Office of
Technology Assessment, 1992).
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trade actions are used to force conformity with national
product standards. Tuna-dolphin trade disputes among
the United States, Mexico, and the European Union
highlight many of these issues (see box—“Tuna-Dolphin
Cases,” p. 14). For example, the WTO is concerned with
finding a scientific basis for national standards and
(under the terms of Article XX) establishing the non-
discriminatory treatment of domestic and foreign
products. While the GATT panel ruled in favor of the
United States in the CAFE standard case, it also sided
with the EU on a provision in the CAFE law that estab-
lishes separate domestic and imported fleet requirements.
WTO may have to determine if and to what extent a
product standard gives the domestic product an unfair
advantage. For example, is it reasonable for a country
to require—as Germany has considered doing—foreign
car manufacturers to take back and recycle old cars
(The Economist, Feb. 27, 1993)?
Trade Actions To Level the Playing Field
Domestic firms and industries (including those with
subsidiaries outside the United States) may seek pro-
tection from competition from foreign firms or industries
subject to lower environmental control costs. Livestock
producers, for example, would benefit from protection
against imports from countries with less demanding
requirements for animal waste management. Economists
see little justification for trade measures designed to
correct for these cost differences, especially if these
differences reflect underlying contrasts in social pref-
erences, resource endowments, and environmental
conditions. This is likely to be a tremendously challeng-
ing area for trade negotiators, as it will be difficult to
establish the legal and technical bases for defining legiti-
mate differences in countries’ environmental standards
that will be acceptable to both environmental and busi-
ness groups. It is also difficult to distinguish disguised
protectionism from genuine environmental concerns.
Finally, when a legitimate environmental issue is iden-
tified, it may be hard to identify when one country has a
right to pressure another to accept its environmental
goals and, possibly, its methods of achieving them.
Economists are likely to recognize that trade measures
can be used to achieve international environmental
objectives but argue that there may be better approaches.
In the case of agriculture-related environmental concerns,
the problems may be sufficiently local that a trade meas-
ure does not constitute a well-targeted, cost-efficient
approach. Trade liberalization can reduce environmental
quality, but sound environmental policy directed at the
problem is preferred on global efficiency grounds to
restricting trade.
Conclusions
This report has explored the linkages between agriculture,
trade, and the environment. Many of the interactions can
be understood in theorectical terms; to facilitate an
understanding of these conceptual constructs, the rela-
tionships have been described and illustrated. Empirical
studies particularly pertinent to the food and agricul-
tural sector also have been discussed. Applied research
efforts have been limited and tend to be based on a
paucity of cross-country environmental data.
In general, the studies have found current levels of envi-
ronmental regulation improving environmental quality
GATT Article XX General Exceptions
Article XX furnishes signatories with
10 exceptions to GATT’s guidelines
aimed at limiting trade restrictions.
Trade measures that fall under Article
XX are permitted on the condition that
they “arenot appliedin amannerwhich
would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade.” Although Article
XX makes no direct reference to envi-
ronmental concerns, subparagraphs (b)
and (g) respectively relate to measures
that are “necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health” and
measures for “the conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in con-
junction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.”
Environmental measures that may re-
quireanalysisunderArticleXXinclude
process restrictions. The Montreal Pro-
tocol’s proposed ban on the import of
products  made using ozone-depleting
chemicals is an example of a process
restriction. WTO members are cur-
rently debating whether subparagraphs
(b) and (g) cover these trade measures.
As nations struggle to achieve environ-
mental goals, it is difficult to predict
whether a given environmental trade
measure will pass a strict interpretation
ofArticleXX.However,withtheinflux
of transboundary pollution and con-
cerns over the ozone layer, it may
become increasingly difficult to reject
trade measures based on jurisdictional
and necessity grounds. (Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, 1992).
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agricultural production, trade, and competitiveness tend
to be small. Also, little evidence suggests that regula-
tions have caused large shifts in production to less
regulated countries. Although some sectors are faced
with additional costs from the regulations, society as a
whole benefits if the environmental policies are well
designed and reflect social preferences. Furthermore,
over the long run, environmental policies can stimulate
technological change and even enhance competitiveness.
Freer trade can bring economic efficiency and growth, but
its effect on environmental quality often depends on the
environmental policies that are in place. The recent WTO
and NAFTA accords acknowledged the trade and envi-
ronment debate but did not fully address concerns
raised by the environmental community. However,
trade agreements may not be the best place to remedy
most environmental problems. Trade agreements are
designed to remove or reform trade-distorting policies,
not to provide disincentives to pollute.
Trade liberalization and environmental goals can work in
tandem. Trade agreements can help remove policies
that support or protect environmentally harmful prac-
tices; they can also help establish common health or
environmental standards on traded goods. Trade liberali-
zation can also contribute to economic growth, a crucial
factor in increasing demand for environmental quality.
Harmonization of some environmental policies and
product standards can facilitate trade, but may be best
done on a cooperative basis and only to the extent that
harmonization promotes standards that are protective in
accordance with social benefits and costs in individual
countries. While some international environmental
agreements have used trade measures to ensure the
environmental goals of their member nations, the uni-
lateral or coercive use of such measures may be open
to WTO challenge. International environmental agree-
ments are the preferred, although often more difficult,
method of achieving international or transboundary goals.
Much of what was discussed in this report is drawn from
a body of literature that grew over the last several years.
While there has been discussion about issues, principles,
and typologies, much remains uncertain and subject to
change. If environomental control costs become a larger
component of costs, or if transboundary or feedback
effects exert stronger pressures on the environment, the
interactions among agriculture, trade, and the environ-
ment could become better defined and pronounced. The
nature of the discussion may change.
The rules of discussion may also change. As with many
contentious issues, debate will evolve as countries devise
new policies and cases are brought before the WTO.
While WTO panel rulings, as GATT panel rulings before,
do not constitute a body of precedence, they strongly
influence international approaches toward trade and
environment issues. Thus, while this paper attempted to
conceptually and empirically explore the linkages, the is-
sues will continue to warrant investigation and discussion.
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